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Abstract
We explore the hypothesis that traditional joint-liability microfinance programs fail to increase bor-
rower incomes in part because they cannot screen out unproductive borrowers. In randomly selected
villages in West Bengal, India, we implemented trader-agent-intermediated lending (TRAIL), in which
local trader-lender agents were incentivized through repayment-based commissions to select borrowers
for individual liability loans. In other randomly selected villages, we organized a group-based lend-
ing (GBL) program in which individuals formed 5-member groups and received joint liability loans.
TRAIL loans increased the production of the leading cash crop by 27% and farm incomes by 22%.
GBL loans had insignificant effects. We develop and test a theoretical model of borrower selection
and incentives. Farmers selected by the TRAIL agents were more able than those who self-selected
into the GBL scheme; this pattern of selection explains 30–40% of the observed difference in income
impacts.
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1 Introduction
Microcredit promised to be a solution to global poverty; yet a large number of experimental
evaluations have found no evidence that it increases borrower incomes or production (Kaboski
and Townsend, 2011, Banerjee, Karlan, and Zinman, 2015). This is true for both joint liability and
individual liability loans (Gine´ and Karlan, 2014, Attanasio, Augsburg, De Haas, Fitzsimons, and
Harmgart, 2015). In other experiments, when rigid repayment schedules were relaxed, microloans
increased farm activity and business incomes. However default rates also rose (Field, Pande, Papp,
and Rigol, 2013, Feigenberg, Field, and Pande, 2013). Thus far, no study has found evidence that
microcredit simultaneously increases borrower incomes and maintains high repayment rates. The
reasons for this are not well understood.
In this paper we examine the hypothesis that one reason traditional group-based microfinance
schemes fail to increase borrower incomes is that they are unable to screen out unproductive
borrowers. Given their greater likelihood of default, unproductive borrowers pay high interest
rates in the informal credit market. As a result they have a strong incentive to apply for MFI
loans. MFI loan officers typically lack fine-grained information about the risk and productivity
of poor borrowers, and cannot screen them with sufficient precision.
Against this backdrop, we designed an alternative mechanism for formal lenders to leverage the
information about borrower characteristics that exists within the local community. We call this
agent-intermediated lending. This paper considers a variant (called trader-agent intermediated
lending or TRAIL) in which the formal lender delegates borrower selection to an agent randomly
chosen from the informal traders/lenders in the community. The agent earns commissions that
depend on the interest paid by recommended clients. This motivates him to select borrowers who
are less likely to default. If default risk and productivity are negatively correlated, the borrower
pool has high average productivity.
To test this mechanism, we conducted a field experiment in two districts of the Indian state of
West Bengal. We implemented TRAIL in 24 randomly selected villages, and an alternative credit
delivery model called group-based lending (GBL) in another set of 24 randomly selected villages.
In each TRAIL village one agent was randomly selected from a list of established trader-lenders
within the village, and was asked to recommend as potential borrowers 30 poor households; in
particular, households that owned at most 1.5 acres of land. Ten of these 30 recommended house-
holds were randomly chosen to receive individual liability loans at below-market interest rates.
The loans were repayable in a single lumpsum at the end of four months, to facilitate their use in
the cultivation of potatoes, the main cash crop in this region. The agent was promised a commis-
sion equal to 75 percent of the interest payments received from borrowers he had recommended.
He also incurred penalties for borrower defaults. Borrowers were incentivized to repay because
future growth in credit access was tied to repayment. The scheme also provided insurance against
covariate risks.
A Kolkata-based microfinance institution (MFI) called Shree Sanchari implemented the GBL
scheme.1 In each GBL village, households owning less than 1.5 acres of cultivable land could
form 5-member groups. Groups were required to meet with loan officers each month and make
1Our version of GBL resembles Shree Sanchari’s joint liability lending model, but may differ from the group-based
lending schemes that other MFIs implement, either in India or elsewhere.
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savings deposits for the six months before the loan scheme began.2 Two groups were randomly
selected from those that completed this initiation process and offered joint liability loans. GBL
loans featured the same interest rate, loan duration, growth in credit access and covariate risk
insurance as the TRAIL loans. The MFI received a commission equal to 75 percent of the interest
payments that GBL borrowers paid. Neither the TRAIL agents, nor the MFI, were responsible
for providing loan capital.
Besides using different methods for borrower selection, the two schemes also generate different
borrower incentives.3 In a joint liability contract the borrower may be called upon to pay up
on behalf of a defaulting group member, thus facing a higher effective interest rate than on
an individual liability loan. This could limit group members’ incentives to expand the scale of
borrowing. Equally, to avoid incurring this “joint liability tax”, group members might monitor
each other and discourage risky projects, such as the adoption of high-value high-risk cash crops
(Fischer, 2013). The TRAIL agent might also help and/or monitor the borrower differently from
how GBL group members help and monitor each other. For these reasons TRAIL and GBL may
generate significantly different impacts, even if there were no selection differences.
It is therefore necessary to distinguish between selection and incentives as explanations for the
difference between the performance of TRAIL and GBL. To this end, we develop and test a the-
oretical model of borrower heterogeneity and incentives that extends Ghatak (2000). Borrower
ability is negatively correlated with default risk and positively correlated with productivity. Our
model includes an informal credit market characterized by different segments in which each seg-
ment consists of at least two competing lenders who are informed about the types of borrowers in
their segment.4 Informal lenders, therefore, have an informational advantage over formal lenders
who are outsiders to the village. However, they face a higher cost of capital. The formal lender
can then appoint one of the informal lenders as a TRAIL agent and offer him interest-based
commissions to leverage his information about borrower types.
Our model shows that TRAIL can generate larger increases in borrower incomes than GBL. This
is because the TRAIL agent selects low-risk high-ability borrowers, who are better able to convert
the loans into income increases. In contrast, the GBL scheme attracts both low and high ability
borrowers, because both borrower types find that GBL loans are cheaper than their informal
loans.
We call the difference in average treatment effects caused by this selection difference the selection
effect. This is compounded by the incentive effect : for a borrower of given ability, a TRAIL loan
increases income by more than a GBL loan does, because the joint liability tax raises the effective
interest rate the GBL borrower faces. Since both selection and incentive effects work in the same
direction, the TRAIL scheme creates larger average treatment effects on production and farm
incomes than the GBL scheme does.
2Many group-lending schemes in different parts of the world require that members save regularly for a pre-
assigned duration or meet a savings target before they can begin to borrow. It is often argued that this builds the
financial discipline required to repay regularly.
3The rationale for bundling selection with liability features stems from practical considerations: Informal lenders
only give out individual liability loans, and Shree Sanchari had only implemented joint liability lending schemes.
Neither wished to become involved in a loan scheme with liability rules that they had no experience with.
4This is necessary to model the borrower selection choices of the TRAIL agent, who is a local informal lender
and observes borrower types within his own segment. We explain the connection with Ghatak’s analysis in more
detail below.
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The model generates a number of other predictions which can be tested using estimates of house-
hold ability. In order to obtain these estimates, we impose a Cobb-Douglas functional form on
the farm production function, and postulate that farmer ability is a composite of fixed factors
owned, other household attributes and household level unobservables. We also impose a constant
elasticity relationship between ability and crop failure risk. This enables us to back out ability
estimates for each household. In particular, the model allows us to estimate each household’s
ability from a regression of the logarithm of cultivation scale or of output on household and year
dummies. Our model can therefore be viewed as a special case of the models in Olley and Pakes
(1996) and Levinsohn and Petrin (2003), in which household ability is fixed over time.
We then test the following predictions of the model: (1) The TRAIL agent is incentivized to
recommend the more able borrowers from his own segment; (2) More able borrowers pay lower
interest rates on the informal market; (3) Borrowing costs, and therefore cultivated area and
crop output, vary less with ability for treated households than for control households; (4) Loan
treatment effects on borrowing, cultivation, output and farm incomes are larger for more able
borrowers; (5) Under weak conditions, the TRAIL scheme selects more able borrowers than the
GBL scheme does. If these predictions hold, the differences in borrower selection patterns cause
the average treatment effect (ATE) of the TRAIL scheme to be larger than the ATE of the GBL
scheme. The differences in the borrower incentives also work in the same direction. Importantly,
the model provides a way to decompose the difference in the ATE into the contributions of
selection and incentive differences.
Our first experimental finding is that the TRAIL loans generated significant ATEs on farm pro-
duction and incomes: average farm value-added increased by 22 percent over the mean. This
is driven by TRAIL households’ increased cultivation of potatoes. GBL loans had a statisti-
cally non-significant effect, estimated at negative 1 percent. The difference in these two ATEs is
statistically significant.
The model makes no definite predictions about how the repayment rates of the TRAIL and GBL
schemes should compare. On the one hand, the average GBL borrower is less able and therefore
has a higher risk of crop failure. On the other hand, conditional on borrower ability, a joint
liability loan is more likely to be repaid than an individual liability loan. This is because other
group members have an incentive to pay even if the borrower’s crop fails. In the data we find
that repayment rates were an equally high 95% over the 3 years in both schemes. However, loan
take-up rates were significantly higher in the TRAIL scheme.
Turning to the detailed predictions of the model, we find definite evidence for predictions 2, 4
and 5, and weaker evidence for predictions 1 and 3. The distribution of estimated ability among
households recommended by TRAIL agents first order stochastically dominated the distribution of
households who self-selected into GBL groups, indicating superior ability selection under TRAIL.
This higher ability of selected borrowers in TRAIL contributed positively to the observed higher
average treatment effect of the TRAIL scheme, so that the selection effect is positive. Our
decomposition indicates that the selection effect is responsible for 30–40 percent of the difference
in ATEs.
We also address a number of other issues. First, one might be concerned that TRAIL agents
abused their power to extract benefits from the borrowers they recommended. We find no evidence
that the agents manipulated the terms of other trading relationships with treated borrowers to
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siphon off their benefits. Neither do we find evidence that the agents helped the TRAIL borrowers
that they recommended by subsidizing their inputs or enabling them to realize higher prices for
output sales. Second, the administrative costs of the TRAIL scheme were lower than those of
the GBL scheme. This is because the MFI incurred substantial costs on high-frequency group
meetings in the GBL scheme, which were not part of the TRAIL design. Since the TRAIL
scheme had a higher take-up rate than and a similar repayment rate to the GBL scheme, TRAIL
outranked GBL on financial performance.
Our focus on borrower heterogeneity and selection patterns is shared by the theoretical analysis
of Ghatak (2000), who considers a model with two borrower types that vary in risk levels and
productivity, but has no informal lenders. In his model, an uninformed outside lender cannot
achieve first best allocations with individual liability contracts, but can do so using joint liability
contracts. In contrast, we model an informal credit market with informed lenders, one of whom is
randomly chosen to be the TRAIL agent. As a result in our model both high and low ability types
can borrow in the absence of an outside lender. We do not examine whether entry by an outside
lender increases high ability borrowers’ access to credit, but instead examine whether group loans
can selectively target such borrowers.
Beaman, Karlan, Thuysbaert, and Udry (2015) are also interested in endogenous borrower selec-
tion. Their eld experiment in Mali compares a group lending program with self-forming groups,
and a grant program with randomly selected recipients. They find that borrowers self-selecting
into the group lending program had higher ability on average than randomly chosen recipients.
We find that on average borrowers self-selecting into groups had lower ability than those recom-
mended by the TRAIL agent.
2 Experimental Design and Data
We designed loan schemes to facilitate the cultivation of a high-value cash crop. In particular we
selected potatoes, the highest-value cash crop in the state of West Bengal, India. Hugli and West
Medinipur are among the largest producers of potatoes in the state. Accordingly, we conducted
our experiment in these two districts.
In both TRAIL and GBL, borrowers were offered repeated loans of 4-month durations at an
annual interest rate of 18%, substantially below the prevailing market rate of 25 percent. The
first loans were capped at |2000 (equivalent to approximately $US40 at the prevailing exchange
rate), and were disbursed in October-November 2010, to coincide with the potato-planting season.
Repayment was due in a single lumpsum after 4 months. In each subsequent cycle, borrowers who
repaid the entire amount that was due became eligible for a 33 percent larger loan on the same
terms as before. Those who repaid less than 50 percent of the repayment due were not allowed to
borrow again. Others were eligible to borrow 133 percent of the principal repaid.5 Both schemes
had an in-built index insurance scheme, according to which the required repayment would be
revised downwards if the revenue per acre for potatoes fell 25 percent below a three year average
5To facilitate credit access for post-harvest storage, borrowers were allowed to repay the loan in the form of cold
storage receipts (or “bonds”) instead of cash. In that case the repayment was calculated at the prevailing price of
the bonds.
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in the village, as assessed through a separate village survey.6
Each sample village was at least 10 kilometers away from all other sample villages, to minimize
contamination of the experimental interventions through the spread of information. The MFI
had not operated in any of the sample villages before our project started, and in general MFI
penetration was low in these regions. A research grant held by the project team provided the
funds for all loans in the two schemes.
As we explained above, we rationed loan offers to 10 borrowers in each village. Therefore, we
are able to estimate loan treatment effects while controlling for selection into the scheme, either
through recommendation by a TRAIL agent or through participation in a GBL group. This is
possible because only a randomly selected subset of households that were recommended (in the
TRAIL villages) or joined groups (in the GBL villages) were offered the program loans. In TRAIL
villages, the agent recommended 30 individuals, and 10 of these were randomly chosen through
a public lottery and offered the loans. In GBL villages, two of the groups that had survived a 6-
month initiation period were randomly chosen through a public lottery to receive loan offers. The
small scale of our interventions implies that spill-overs on non-beneficiaries in the experimental
villages were unlikely. The loan treatment effects are then estimated as differences in outcomes
between those randomly chosen to receive a loan offer (we call these Treatment households),
and those who were recommended or formed a group, but were unlucky in the lottery and did
not receive the loan offer (we call these Control 1 households). Our approach resembles that of
Karlan and Zinman (2011), in which loan assignment was randomized among borrowers deemed
marginally creditworthy by a credit scoring algorithm. To examine whether households that were
selected into the scheme were different from those not selected, we can compare the Control 1
households with Control 2 households. Control 2 households are those who fell below the land
threshold, but were not recommended in TRAIL villages, or did not form groups in GBL villages.
2.1 The Trader-Agent-Intermediated Lending (TRAIL) Scheme
Project activities began in TRAIL villages in September 2010. The project team consulted with
prominent persons in each village to draw up a list of traders and business people who had
operated a business in the village for at least three years, and had at least 50 clients. One person
from this list was randomly chosen and invited to become a TRAIL agent.7 The agent was asked
to (confidentially) recommend as potential borrowers 30 village residents who owned no more
than 1.5 acres of agricultural land. In October 2010, our project officer selected 10 out of these
30 names through a public lottery. Loan officers visited the treated households in their homes to
explain the loan terms and later to disburse the loan if it was accepted.
At the beginning of the scheme, the agent was required to put down a deposit of |50 per borrower.
The deposit was refunded to the agent at the end of two years, in proportion to the loan repayment
6In yet another 24 villages, an alternative version of the agent intermediated lending scheme (called GRAIL) was
implemented, where a member of the village council (Gram Panchayat) was appointed as the agent. The GRAIL
agent is likely to have been motivated by the political benefits of participating in the scheme. The treatment effects
of the GRAIL program will be analysed in a separate paper.
7The experimental protocol stated that if the person approached rejected the offer, the position would be offered
to another randomly chosen person from the list. However the first person offered the position accepted in every
village.
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rates of his recommended borrowers. At the end of each loan cycle he received as commission
75% of the interest received on these loans. The agent’s contract was terminated at the end of
any cycle in which 50% of borrowers whom he had recommended failed to repay. Agents were
also promised an expenses-paid holiday at a local sea-side resort if they survived in the program
for two years.
Loan officers’ interactions with borrowers were limited to single visits to the borrowers’ residences
at the beginning of each cycle to disburse loans and at the end of each cycle to collect loans. They
were not required to engage in any monitoring or collection effort beyond this. Borrowers were
also not required to report to the loan officers their intended or actual use of the loan.8
A potential concern with the TRAIL intervention is that agents might have acted in ways that
undermined the scheme. For instance, they might have asked for bribes to recommend borrowers,
selected unsuitable borrowers (with high default risk, less productive individuals, wealthy indi-
viduals, or cronies in exchange for bribes or favors), extracted borrower benefits by manipulating
other transactions with them, colluded with borrowers (encouraged them to default and divide
up the loan funds instead) or coerced them to repay. To help guard against these possibilities,
all loan transactions took place directly between the loan officers and the borrower. The research
team verified that the agent followed the protocol and that households with landholding above the
stipulated threshold did not receive program loans. The team also communicated clearly to all
borrowers that the interest rate was fixed, there were no other charges for participation, and that
all payments were to be made only to the loan officers. Later we examine the borrower recom-
mendation patterns in the data, and also check for evidence that the TRAIL agent manipulated
his transactions with the treated households. We find no evidence that this is the case.
2.2 The Group-based Lending (GBL) Scheme
The MFI began operations in the GBL villages in February-March 2010 by inviting residents
who owned no more than 1.5 acres of land to form 5-member groups, and then organizing bi-
monthly group meetings, where each member was expected to deposit |50 per month into the
group account. Of the groups that survived until October 15, 2010, two were randomly selected
into the scheme through a public lottery. Each group member received a loan of |2,000 in Cycle 1,
repayable in a single lump sum at the end of four months. Thus the entire group received |10,000.
All group members shared liability for the entire sum: if less than 50% of the due amount was
repaid in any cycle, all members were disqualified from future loans; otherwise the group was
eligible for a new loan, which was 33% larger than the previous loan. Bi-monthly group meetings
continued throughout, in keeping with the MFI’s standard protocol for joint liability lending. At
the end of each loan cycle the MFI received as commission 75% of the interest received on these
loans.9
8However in our household surveys we did ask respondents to tell us how they used each loan.
9Thus, the incentives provided to TRAIL agents and to the MFI were identical. Both faced the same formula
for commissions. The paid holiday for TRAIL agents who were not terminated was akin to the internal bonus that
Shree Sanchari loan officers could expect if their job performance was considered satisfactory.
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2.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
The villages where the experiment was conducted had an average of 393 households per village.
Three-quarters of villages had a primary school, 23% had a primary health centre, 8% had a bank
branch and 33% of the villages had access to a metalled road. Households had 5 members on
average. The majority of the households were Hindu, and among them, there were roughly equal
proportions of high and low castes. The average landholding of village households was 0.46 acres.
Nearly 95% of households had male heads, about 42% of the household heads had completed
primary schooling and about half reported that agricultural cultivation was their primary occu-
pation. Panel A in Table 1 provides checks of balance across the villages randomly assigned to the
TRAIL versus GBL treatment arms. As can be seen, there were almost no significant differences
in village-level characteristics across the two groups.
Table 2 describes the mean characteristics of the major categories of crops grown by sample
farmers during the three years of our study. It is clear that potatoes were the highest-value crop
in these villages: they accounted for a significant proportion of acreage, had the highest working
capital needs, and generated nearly three times as much value-added per acre as other major
crops.
In each village, the sample consisted of 50 households, composed of three sub-groups. First, we
included all 10 borrowers who were randomly chosen to receive the loan (Treatment households).
Second, of the remaining 20 recommended individuals, we included a random subset of 10 (Control
1 households). Finally, we included 30 households randomly chosen from the non-recommended
(Control 2) households. In the GBL villages, of all the groups that formed, two groups were
randomly selected and offered the loan. We included all 10 households from these two groups in
the sample (Treatment households). Two groups that had formed but were not offered loans were
also randomly chosen into the sample (Control 1). Finally, we randomly chose 30 households that
did not form groups (Control 2).
Treatment households in both schemes received their first loan in October 2010. The first round of
household surveys was conducted in December 2010. The surveys collected data about household
demographics, assets, landholding, cultivation, land use, agricultural input use, sale and storage
of agricultural output, credit received and given, incomes, and economic relationships within
the village. Loans were repayable at the end of four months, and new loans could be taken
immediately after repayment. Subsequent survey rounds were also conducted at four-monthly
intervals. Surveys had a recall period of four months. The high frequency of the data collection
helped minimize measurement error. There was no attrition in the sample over the three years.
In each sample household the same respondent answered survey questions in each round.
Our analysis is restricted to the 2070 sample households who owned less than, or equal to, 1.5 acres
of land.10 Panel B of Table 1 checks whether the selected households (recommended households in
TRAIL villages/participating households in GBL villages) were evenly assigned to Treatment and
10Only households that owned no more than 1.5 acres of land could be recommended, so that Treatment and
Control 1 groups were almost entirely made up of households below the threshold. However the Control 2 group
included households that owned more than 1.5 acres of land. For the sake of a clean comparison we do not include
these households in our estimation sample. This explains why our estimation sample of 2070 households is smaller
than the sample of 2400 households for whom we collected data.
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Control 1 groups. For most characteristics, we see only minor differences across the two groups.
The F-statistic shows that we cannot reject the joint hypothesis of no differences across the two
arms in either the TRAIL or GBL villages.
Table 3 describes credit transactions for all sample households that owned less than 1.5 acres
of land. We present here both total borrowing and borrowing for agricultural purposes from
September–December 2010, which is when potatoes are planted.11 We do not include loans re-
ceived through the TRAIL or GBL schemes. Since potato cultivation is working capital-intensive,
column (2) of the table depicts the main sources of agricultural credit, and characteristics of agri-
cultural loans. About 67% of sample households borrowed during this 4-month period. Traders
and moneylenders were the most important source: they provided 63% of all agricultural credit.
Credit cooperatives provided about a quarter, but they loaned mainly to households with rela-
tively larger landholdings (statistics available upon request). Consistent with low MFI penetra-
tion, MFIs and other sources provided only 3% of the total credit.
The average interest rate on loans from traders and moneylenders was 25%, substantially above
the 18% interest rate charged on the TRAIL and GBL program loans. The average duration
of these loans was a little over 120 days, reflecting the 4-month agricultural cycles in this area.
Loans from family and friends were also more expensive than the program loans, and were given
for about 6 months.12 It was extremely rare for any of the informal loans to be secured by
collateral. Cooperatives and government banks charged substantially lower interest rates and
provided longer-duration loans. However, they were more likely to require collateral, which may
explain why their share became progressively smaller as household landholding decreased. Land-
less households received 87% of their agricultural credit from informal lenders, and only 6% from
cooperatives (statistics available upon request).
3 Theoretical Model of Selection
Our model is based on two key features: borrower heterogeneity, and a segmented informal credit
market. Borrowers vary in (exogenously-determined) ability; more able borrowers have lower
default risk and higher productivity. Ability variations could reflect either differences in total
factor productivity, such as experience or farming skill or in the ownership of complementary
fixed factors, such as land or household labor stock. Any selection-based exploration of output
or income effects of microcredit must incorporate such heterogeneity in borrower ability.13 The
model abstracts from moral hazard, although similar results can be obtained in extensions that
incorporate moral hazard (presented in previous versions of this paper). Defaults arise from
incidents of crop failure (such as a pest attack) combined with limited liability: when their crop
11We use our detailed survey data documenting the purchase of inputs to ensure that all trade credit used for
input purchases is included in our measure of borrowing.
12We do not consider loans where the repayment amount due was reported to be equal to the principal, since
these interest-free loans are likely to be gifts from altruistic lenders, and thus lie outside the ambit of the informal
credit market.
13Thus “ability” in our model represents more than just intrinsic characteristics of a farmer, but also includes
human capital that could have been acquired over time (before the study began), and physical capital (which we
assume remains fixed during the study), all of which may contribute to higher productivity and higher likelihood
of crop success.
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fails, farmers do not have the means to repay their loans. More able farmers are less likely to
experience crop failure because they are better at preventing the pest attack. The risk of crop
failure is not correlated across farmers. Besides productivity, the model incorporates associated
variations in default risk in order to explain the TRAIL agent’s induced selection choices.
Each farmer endogenously chooses the scale of cultivation, measured by area cultivated or ex-
penditure on variable inputs. Conditional on their crop succeeding, more able farmers are more
productive insofar as they produce more output from a given scale of cultivation. Specifically, a
farmer of ability i experiences crop failure with probability (1 − pi) ∈ (0, 1) and produces noth-
ing; otherwise he produces θif(l) where l denotes the level of input (≡ loan size) chosen by the
farmer. The production function f is smooth, strictly increasing and strictly concave with f ′(0)
large enough to ensure interior production for all parameter values and ability levels. Both pi
and θi are non-decreasing in i, while their product (or expected productivity) θ¯i ≡ piθi is strictly
increasing. It will turn out that the limited liability constraint will never bind in the absence of
a crop failure: farmers will always cultivate on a scale that generates sufficient output to repay
their loans. Informal lenders are able to monitor whether their borrower’s crop succeeds, and can
impose sufficient penalties to deter voluntary default. Hence the default risk of a farmer of ability
i is 1− pi.
In the simplest version of the model, there are only two possible ability levels: high (i = H) and
low (i = L), with H > L. A given proportion µH of borrowers are highly able. Extension to the
case of more types is straightforward. To keep the exposition simple we restrict attention to the
two-type case for the time being. In Section 3.5 we allow for specific functional forms and for
ability to vary continuously.
3.1 Pre-Intervention Informal Credit Market
Each village is partitioned into S different segments on the basis of physical or social proximity.
These can be thought of as hamlets, neighborhoods or networks. There are N borrowers in the
village divided equally across these S segments, and each segment has the same proportion of H
type borrowers. Each segment also has at least two informal lenders who can distinguish borrower
types in their own segment, but not in any other segment. All lenders have the same cost of capital
ρ per unit loaned, and face no capacity constraints. They compete with one another in Bertrand
fashion to make credit offers consisting either of an interest rate (with the borrower deciding how
much to borrow), or of a loan size and interest rate pair. The location of each agent in the village
is determined exogenously.
Standard arguments imply that the lenders in any given segment will specialize in lending to highly
able borrowers in their own segment, and will compete with each other so that in equilibrium
they will offer them any amount at interest rate ρpH . Low ability borrowers will be able to borrow
from any lender in the village at the interest rate ρpL , because all lenders will be willing to lend
to any borrower in the village at this rate.14
14An informal lender will not be willing to lower the interest rate below ρ
pL
for any low ability borrower in his
own segment. He will not offer borrowers from other segments an interest rate below ρ
pL
because the only borrowers
who would accept that offer would be the low ability ones, resulting in losses.
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Thus, before the MFI intervention, borrower of type i will borrow l¯i where
θ¯if
′(l¯i) = ρ (1)
which is a Walrasian allocation. The segmentation of the market has no consequence for the
allocation. However, segmentation affects the outcomes of the TRAIL intervention, to which we
now turn.
3.2 TRAIL Intervention
Suppose now that the MFI enters and offers loans at interest rate rT which is below ρ, the cost
of capital for informal lenders. The MFI’s comparative advantage over the informal lenders is
its lower capital cost. However, it suffers from an informational disadvantage: it is unable to
identify the ability of any given borrower. To overcome this, it randomly selects an informal
lender, and appoints him as its agent. The agent is asked to recommend to the MFI n borrowers
from the village as potential borrowers for TRAIL individual liability loans at interest rate rT .
The MFI then offers loans to a randomly selected fraction of those recommended. The agent
is paid a commission at the rate of m ∈ (0, 1) per unit of interest repaid by the borrowers he
recommended. This incentivizes the agent to recommend borrowers who have a lower risk of crop
failure. As with informal loans, we assume that the borrower always has the incentive to repay
the loan, so that there is no voluntary default.15
The TRAIL agent’s selection incentives are as follows. Assuming for now that he does not collude
with borrowers, he tries to maximize the likelihood that the TRAIL loans are repaid. To achieve
this, his most-preferred borrowers are the H-type borrowers from his own segment. His second
preference is for randomly chosen borrowers from other segments, and this is followed finally by
L-type borrowers in his own segment. If n ≤ NS µH , then all the borrowers he recommends are
H-type from his own segment. Otherwise, he recommends all the H-type borrowers from his own
segment and then fills the remaining slots with randomly chosen borrowers from other segments.16
Note that, in the more general model where ability varies continuously (Section 3.5), among the
own-segment borrowers there will exist a threshold type such that the agent will be indifferent
between recommending him, or instead recommending someone from outside the segment. If
the set of borrowers the agent chooses from is not large, then it is difficult to predict how the
realized average ability of these randomly chosen out-of-segment borrowers will compare with the
recommended and not-recommended own-segment individuals. Hence, our only definite prediction
is that among the own-segment individuals, those recommended have higher ability than those
not recommended.
We assume that the TRAIL loans do not crowd out the informal loans that the borrowers already
have from informal lenders.17 In Section 4.1.1 we shall verify the validity of this assumption in
15This can be because defaulting borrowers are cut off from future access to TRAIL loans, or because the informal
lender pressurizes the borrower to repay.
16This is under the reasonable assumption that the total population of other segments exceeds n.
17This could be because TRAIL loans may not be close substitutes for informal loans, which have more flexible
durations or repayment terms. Alternatively, borrowers are uncertain about how long the TRAIL intervention will
be available and so are reluctant to disrupt their pre-existing credit channels.
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the data. We also simplify by assuming that the TRAIL credit limit is not binding: each farmer’s
desired TRAIL loan size is smaller than the amount the MFI offers. The main conclusions continue
to apply when the limit is binding for some borrowers.18
We can now predict the impact of the TRAIL intervention. A selected farmer of ability i will
select a TRAIL loan lTi satisfying
θ¯if
′(l¯i + lTi ) = pirT (2)
Conditions (1) and (2) can easily be used to compare levels of borrowing, output and farmer
income across types, both before and after the intervention, as stated in the lemma below.
Lemma 1 Comparison of Levels: Higher ability types borrow, produce and earn more than
lower ability types, both before and after being offered the TRAIL loan.
The less trivial question is how treatment effects on borrowing, output or income vary by borrower
type. This is ambiguous in general. Starting with the loan treatment effect, the question is: will
more able farmers take larger TRAIL loans? There are three relevant forces here:
(a) Productivity Difference: More able farmers have higher productivity, so they derive larger
benefits from expanding the scale of cultivation;
(b) Diminishing Returns: More able farmers produced more before the intervention, and so they
have a lower marginal rate of return to expanding cultivation, controlling for productivity
differences;
(c) Subsidy Difference: More able farmers paid a lower interest rate on the informal market
before the intervention, so the intervention lowers their interest rate by less.
The productivity difference induces more able farmers to take larger TRAIL loans, but the di-
minishing returns and smaller interest rate subsidy work in the opposite direction. As a result it
is unclear whether the overall treatment effect would be larger for more able types.
Consider the case where high and low ability farmers are equally productive, so that they only
vary in default risk. Then it follows from the above that the loan treatment effect will be de-
creasing in ability.19 Now introduce productivity differences, so that θi increases in i. Then
18A binding credit ceiling will not affect the default risk, so leaves the TRAIL agent’s selection incentives un-
affected. If the ceiling were binding for both high and low ability borrowers, the TRAIL loan size would be the
same for both, while the higher ability type would borrow more before the TRAIL scheme was introduced. This
would imply that the loan treatment effect is decreasing in ability. Instead we see that the loan treatment effect is
increasing in ability. It follows that even if the ceiling is binding at all, it cannot bind for the low ability type. In
this case it can be readily be verified that parts (a) and (b) in Lemma 2 will continue to apply. In the empirical
analysis these are the two parts that turn out to be relevant.
19To see why, note that any given borrower of type i selects the TRAIL loan size l = lTi to maximize net income
conditional on crop success θif(l¯i + l)− rT l. If there are no productivity differences, θi does not vary with i: then
all ability types would have the same aggregate borrowing, cultivation, output and income (conditional on crop
success). Since higher ability types borrow more before the credit intervention, the loan treatment effect would
decrease in i.
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higher ability borrowers who are offered TRAIL loans borrow a larger total volume (l¯i + l
T
i ). The
pre-intervention scale of borrowing depends entirely on expected productivity θ¯i. Therefore if
expected productivity (θ¯i) is constant and productivity (θi) accounts for more of it, so that the
crop success rate (pi) accounts for less of it, then total borrowing after the intervention (l¯i + l
T
i )
increases more steeply in ability i than pre-intervention borrowing (l¯i) does. This means that
loan treatment effects increase in ability. In the limiting case where crop risk does not vary at all
with ability, we show below that the loan treatment effect must increase in i. Hence the relative
importance of productivity variations relative to crop risk variations in ability determines how
loan treatment effects vary with ability.
In the following result, we restrict attention to production functions satisfying a Regularity Con-
dition (RC): −f
′′
f ′ is decreasing. This condition is satisfied by the constant elasticity function
f(l) = 1α l
α with α < 1, α 6= 0, which corresponds to the logarithmic function, as well as the
exponential function (f(l) = Γ[1− exp(−al)] with a > 0).
Lemma 2 Comparisons of TRAIL Impacts Across Types: Suppose that the production
function satisfies RC, and that expected productivity θ¯i is strictly increasing in ability i.
(a) If the loan treatment effect is rising in ability, the output treatment effect will also be rising
in ability.
(b) If variation in productivity accounts for all (or most) of the variation in expected productivity
(so that the crop success probability pi is entirely or nearly independent of ability), then loan,
output and income treatment effects will be rising in ability,
(c) If all (or most) of the variation in expected productivity is accounted for by variation in the
probability of crop success (so that productivity is entirely or nearly independent of ability),
then loan and output treatment effects will be falling in ability.
The proof of Lemma 2 is in the Appendix. Parts (b) and (c) show that how the treatment effects
vary with ability depends on whether productivity or crop risk is more sensitive to variations in
ability.20
The empirical analysis in subsequent sections will examine how loan, cultivation and income
treatment effects vary with ability. The results above help to see why the model must incorporate
variations in both default risk and productivity. If we had assumed farmers vary only in default
risk, part (c) of Lemma 2 shows that TRAIL treatment effects would be falling in ability, which
would have unduly restricted the predictions of the model and rendered it unable to accommodate
the opposite pattern. If instead farmers vary only in productivity, then we would be unable to
explain the TRAIL agents’ selection patterns, because the agent is incentivized on repayment
rates and not on the borrower’s output.
Importantly the model enables us to empirically disentangle the two sources of variation: differ-
ences in informal interest rates reflect variations in default risk, and, given Lemma 2, the pattern
20In case (c) we are not able to provide a definite result about how treatment effects on farm income vary across
types. It can be shown that they decrease in ability if the scale of the TRAIL loans is small enough, i.e., when
[ ρ
pL
− rT ] is not too large.
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of variation of TRAIL treatment effects then reveals the importance of productivity differences.
For example, if we find that treatment effects are rising while interest rates are falling in ability,
then we can infer that higher ability farmers have lower default risk and are also significantly
more productive.
3.2.1 Collusion between the TRAIL agent and borrowers
Now consider the consequences of corruption, where the TRAIL agent can charge bribes in return
for recommendations. Loan sizes could also be collusively chosen, so that recommended TRAIL
borrowers internalize the larger commissions that the agent would earn if the loan were to become
larger.
In this case, the effective interest rate on the loan for the coalition would be (1 −m)rT (where
m is the agent’s commission rate) instead of the rT from the non-collusive equilibrium. Lemma 2
would continue to hold, with the effective TRAIL interest rate adjusted from rT to (1−m)rT , as
above. If productivity variations are larger than default risk variations, case (b) applies and the
borrower income treatment effects increase in ability. Then high ability borrowers benefit more
from the loan than low ability borrowers, and are willing to pay larger bribes. Thus collusion
reinforces the agent’s incentive to recommend high ability borrowers.21
3.3 GBL Intervention
As is standard in the literature (see for example Besley and Coate, 1995, Ghatak, 1999, 2000),
we simplify the analysis by assuming that each GBL group consists of two members. The MFI
requires individuals to self-select into groups. Group members then apply for a joint liability loan,
which is offered at the same interest rate rT as the TRAIL loan. Each member is potentially liable
for the loans of both members. In addition, the GBL program requires members to periodically
attend group meetings and meet savings targets. The cost of meeting these requirements varies
idiosyncratically in the population and is uncorrelated with their type: we assume the cost for
any borrower c is drawn from a distribution with positive density g over the nonnegative reals.
As in the analysis of the TRAIL scheme, we abstract from repayment incentives, and assume that
borrowers honor their obligations whenever their own project does not fail.
In contrast to Ghatak (1999, 2000), the scale of cultivation and hence the loan size is variable.
Consistent with Ghatak’s formulation we assume that members of a group cooperate, i.e. can
make side payments without any friction in order to internalize externalities they exert on each
other. Then the loan size choices lGi = l
G
ij , l
G
j = l
G
ji for any group (whose members have types i, j)
will maximize the sum of their respective ex ante payoffs: θ¯if(l¯i + l
G
i ) + θ¯jf(l¯j + l
G
j )− rT [pi{lGi +
(1− pj)lGj }+ pj{lGj + (1− pi)lGi }], implying
θ¯if
′(l¯i + lGij) = [pi + (1− pi)pj ]rT (3)
21This would obtain regardless of whether the collusion game were modeled cooperatively with stable matching
followed by Nash Bargaining, or non-cooperatively, where either side makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the other.
We omit the details here.
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The expected value of the extra liability that group member j bears in the event that i’s crop
fails is (1 − pi)pjrT li. This “joint liability tax” raises the effective cost of the GBL loan relative
to the TRAIL loan. So the GBL borrower chooses a lower scale of borrowing than the TRAIL
borrower of the same ability. Hence we obtain
Lemma 3 Comparison of TRAIL and GBL Impacts for a Given Borrower Type: For
any given ability type, the TRAIL treatment impact on loan size, cultivation scale, output and
income is larger than the GBL treatment impact.
Treatment effects on borrowing and income will therefore be smaller for GBL loans than for
TRAIL loans, controlling for ability. A similar effect would arise if the model were extended to
incorporate help or monitoring by the TRAIL agent that enhances productivity by more than
similar services by other group members, or MFI officers.
As they have similar costs of attending group meetings and meeting savings requirements, both
high and low ability borrowers have an incentive to participate in the GBL scheme. To see this,
consider first a homogenous group, i.e. one in which both members are of type i. Each group
member faces an expected interest rate of pi(2− pi)rT , which is lower than what she pays in the
informal market, since rT <
ρ
pi(2−pi) .
22 Hence, homogenous groups of either type would prefer
a GBL loan to the status quo. If positive assortative matching does not obtain, heterogenous
(H,L) groups could also form.23 Either way, both low and high risk types would join groups and
apply for GBL loans.
The composition of the GBL applicant pool would depend on how the benefits to different groups
were rank-ordered. However, the key point is that the proportion of low ability GBL applicants will
be bounded away from zero: even with positive assortative matching and the resulting homogenous
groups, both high ability groups and low ability groups have an incentive to borrow, and with
negative assortative matching even mixed groups would form. Thus, unlike the TRAIL scheme
where the agent acts as gate-keeper, there is no mechanism in the GBL scheme that keeps low
ability borrowers out. We therefore expect the TRAIL agent to recommend a larger proportion
of high ability borrowers than those who self-select into the GBL scheme.24
Lemma 4 Differences in Selection Patterns between TRAIL and GBL:
(a) If n ≤ NS µH , all TRAIL borrowers are H-type, but only a fraction of GBL groups are of
H-type.
(b) If n > NS µH , the proportion of borrowers who are H-type in the TRAIL scheme is weakly
larger than µH . The TRAIL scheme also has more H-type borrowers than the GBL scheme,
unless GBL treatment effects are rising in ability and n is sufficiently large relative to NS µH .
22This follows from the fact that pi(2− pi) < 1, for any i.
23In this setting where loan sizes are endogenously chosen, it is difficult to pin down the exact conditions under
which positive assortative matching would result.
24This is provided the number of recommendations required does not greatly exceed the number of high ability
borrowers in the agent’s own segment of the informal credit market.
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3.4 Decomposing TRAIL-GBL Differences in Impacts into Selection and In-
centive Effects
We can express the average treatment effect on any given outcome of intervention v (where v = T
if the scheme is TRAIL, and v = G if the scheme is GBL) as an average of the treatment effects
for different borrower types, using as weights the proportion of selected borrowers that belong to
the type, as follows:
T v ≡ ωvT vH + (1− ωv)T vL (4)
where for intervention v, T vi denotes the treatment effect on a type i borrower, T
v denotes the
average treatment effect and ωv denotes the fraction of H types selected. The difference between
TRAIL and GBL average treatment effects can then be expressed as
T T − TG ≡ [ωG(T TH − TGH ) + (1− ωG)(T TL − TGL )] + (ωT − ωG)(T TH − T TL ) (5)
The difference in average treatment effects is the sum of two terms. We call the first term the
Incentive Effect. It is a weighted average of the differences in treatment effects of the two schemes
for a given borrower type, using as weights the selection likelihoods for each type in the GBL
scheme. We refer to the second term as the Selection Effect. It is the product of the difference
in TRAIL treatment effects between the two types, and the difference in the proportion of H-
types between the two interventions. Thus it captures the extent to which differences in borrower
selection patterns cause the treatment effects of the two schemes to differ. From this and the
preceding lemmas it follows that
Lemma 5 Sufficient Condition for Comparing Average Treatment Effects: The average
treatment effect of TRAIL loans is larger than the average treatment effect of GBL loans if TRAIL
treatment effects increase in ability, and the TRAIL agent’s recommendations contain a larger
proportion of H types than the borrowers who self-select into the GBL scheme (e.g. if n is smaller
than NS µH , or is not much larger).
Note that this is a sufficient condition, but not necessary. The purpose of this lemma is to show
that the model provides a possible explanation for the larger average treatment effects of the
TRAIL scheme than the GBL scheme.
3.5 Specific Functional Forms
The results in the lemmas above depend on assumptions on unknown parameters, and on covari-
ations between observable variables and farmer ability, which is unobserved by the researcher. As
a result they are not directly testable. For the empirical analysis we therefore impose a specific
functional form that allows us to estimate ability from data we do observe, so that we obtain
testable predictions. This also allows us to evaluate the respective roles of selection and incen-
tive effects in driving the difference between the treatment effects of the TRAIL scheme and the
treatment effects of the GBL scheme.
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We assume the production function is Cobb-Douglas:
Y = θ1−γ [
1
1− αl
1−α] (6)
where θ denotes ability, l the scale of cultivation chosen by the farmer, and parameters γ, α ∈ (0, 1).
The probability of crop success is given by
p(θ) = Pθ1−ν (7)
where ν ∈ (0, 1) and P is the average crop success rate or yield within the village. To keep
probabilities between zero and one, we impose an upper bound Θ < ∞ on ability and then
restrict P ≤ [Θ]ν−1. A particular example of this is P = χ[a¯]ν−1 for some χ ∈ (0, 1), so that
p(θ) = χ[
θ
Θ
]1−ν (8)
Note the following features of this specification:
(a) If ν is close to 1 while γ is not close to 1, most of the variation in expected productivity
is driven by variation in productivity rather than default risk, corresponding to case (b) of
Lemma 2. Conversely, if γ is close to one while ν is not, most of the variation is accounted
by default risk, and case (c) holds.
(b) Previously we considered only two borrower types: high and low. In this version ability
varies continuously. So we keep track of how pre-, post- and treatment effects vary with
ability, and can construct a continuous ability index.
A control group farmer of ability θ borrows from informal lenders, and so maximizes θ1−γp(θ) 11−α l
1−α−
ρl. This gives us an expression for the scale of cultivation lC .
log lC =
1
α
logA+
1
α
[logP − log ρ] (9)
where
A ≡ θ2−γ−ν (10)
varies monotonically with ability, which varies across households. In what follows below we will
therefore use A or θ interchangeably to measure ability. The second term on the right-hand-side
of (9) includes covariate shocks to yields and the cost of capital, which varies at the village-year
level, but not across households within a given village-year.
A TRAIL treated farmer of ability θ (or equivalently measured by A as in equation (10) above)
selects the TRAIL loan l∗ to maximize p(θ)θ1−γ 11−α [l
C + l∗]1−α − p(θ)rT l∗, implying that
log l∗ = δ
1
α
logA− 1
α
log rT (11)
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where lT ≡ lC + l∗ denotes aggregate scale of cultivation for treated farmers, and
δ ≡ 1− γ
2− γ − ν (12)
which lies between 0 and 1. We see here that the expected cost of borrowing increases in ability
for treated borrowers but not for control borrowers. As a result the scale of cultivation varies
less sharply with ability for TRAIL treated borrowers than for control borrowers. The intuitive
reason is that informal lenders are able to offer more able borrowers lower interest rates, unlike
the MFI.
Returning to condition (a) from the above, if ν is close to 1 while γ is not close to 1, then most of
the variation in expected productivity is driven by variation in productivity rather than default
risk and case (b) of Lemma 2 applies. We see from equation (12) above that this also implies that
δ is close to 1. Therefore in the empirical analysis we will check the value of δ, and if we find that
it is close to 1 we will expect TRAIL treatment effects to be larger for households with greater
ability.
Averaging across groups, the effective borrowing cost for a member with ability θi is p(θi)[1−p¯]+p¯
which is increasing linearly in p(θi). Here p¯ denotes the average success probability.
Similar expressions also arise for the expected output of treated and control households. For
control households:
logE[Y C ] =
1
α
logA+
1
α
[logP − (1− α) log ρ]− log(1− α) (13)
while for TRAIL treated households:
logE[Y T ] = [δ
1
α
+ (1− δ)] logA+ logP − (1− α)
α
log rT − log(1− α) (14)
and again we see that log output varies less with ability for treated households than for control
households.
In GBL villages, expressions (9) and (13) continue to apply for control households. For treated
households, however, the expressions for effective cost of borrowing depend on the pattern of
matching and do not have closed-form solutions. Therefore we cannot estimate the ability of
GBL treated households without making additional assumptions. Fortunately for our subsequent
analysis we do not need ability estimates for these households.
3.5.1 Estimating Ability
From this point onwards, we denote households by h. We assume that the ability of household
h depends on observable farmer characteristics Xkh, k = 1, . . . such as land owned, number of
household members engaged in cultivation, gender, caste and religion of head:
Ah = ThX
ψ1
1hX
ψ2
2h ... (15)
where ψk > 0 are unknown parameters to be estimated, and Th is a household specific component
which is unobservable to us and MFI officials, although it may be observed by borrowers and
agents. Household characteristics are assumed to be time-invariant.
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From equations (15) and (7), the scale of cultivation or output of control group household h
located in village v in year t satisfies:
log lCht =
1
α
[log Th − log ρvt + logPvt] + 1
α
∑
k
ψk logXkh (16)
thereby generating the regression specification
log lCht = uh + µvt +
∑
k
βkXkh + ht (17)
which can be estimated by ordinary least squares or random effects regressions. Under the strong
assumption that observable household characteristics are uncorrelated with unobservable charac-
teristics or the error term, the coefficients βk ≡ 1αψk provide consistent estimates of the correlates
of ability. They can be used to construct a continuous ability index equal to the predicted value
1
α
logAh = uˆh +
∑
k
βˆkXkh (18)
for both control and treated households. An alternative procedure that allows for both observable
and unobservable components of ability and requires weaker assumptions, estimates ability as the
household fixed effect in regressions of cultivation scale or output, as follows:
log lCht = ζh + µvt + ht (19)
log lTht = δζh +K + µvt + ht (20)
where K is a constant representing the mean difference log ρ¯ − log rT in the cost of borrowing
between control and treated households, and subscript v denotes the village in which h resides.
We then obtain estimates of ability
1
α
logAh ≡ ζh (21)
For control households, equation (19) delivers estimates of ζh, but for treated households equation
(20) delivers estimates of pih ≡ δζh + K. To isolate ζh for treated households we utilize the fact
that households recommended by the TRAIL agent were randomly assigned to treatment, so that
Treatment and Control 1 households are drawn from the same distribution of ζh. It follows that
both the Treatment and Control 1 groups must have the same mean and variance of ζh. Hence
E[pih|h ∈ T ] = K + δE[ζh|h ∈ T ] = K + δE[ζh|h ∈ C1] (22)
and
Var[pih|h ∈ T ] = δ2Var[ζh|h ∈ T ] = δ2Var[ζh|h ∈ C1] (23)
These two moment conditions allow us to estimate δ and K (where hats denote sample estimates)
as follows:
δˆ =
[
Vˆar[pih|h ∈ T ]
Vˆar[ζh|h ∈ C1]
] 1
2
(24)
Kˆ = Eˆ[pih|h ∈ T ]− δˆEˆ[ζh|h ∈ C1] (25)
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ζˆh =
pˆih − Kˆ
δˆ
(26)
We can then examine how the estimated TRAIL treatment effect on farm value-added varies with
ζˆh, by regressing the farm value-added in TRAIL villages on the treatment dummy, interacted
with ability. This reveals the heterogeneity of the TRAIL treatment effect with respect to ability,
denoted by T v(ζ).
The exact analytical expression for T v(ζ) is somewhat cumbersome; it is neither linear or log-linear
in ζ. We can estimate a “non-parametric” version by discretizing the ability index. We divide the
range of estimated ability values into quartiles and then replace the ability index ζˆ with dummy
variables indicating the quartile it belongs to (qi = 1 if and only if ζˆi ∈ (Zˆi, Zˆi+1), i = 1, . . . , 4).
From a regression of farm value-added on interactions of the treatment dummy with the ability
quartile qi, we can estimate TRAIL treatment effects Tr
T (qi) within each quartile qi.
Finally, the difference between the TRAIL and the GBL treatment effects can be decomposed as
follows. If we denote the loan scheme with v, the average treatment effect is
Trv ≡
∫
σv(ζ)T v(ζ)dζ (27)
where σv(.) denotes the density of the ability distribution of households selected to participate in
scheme v. Hence the difference between the two average treatment effects can be decomposed:
TrT − TrG =
∫
[σT (ζ)− σG(ζ)]T T (ζ)dζ +
∫
σG(ζ)[T T (ζ)− TG(ζ)]dζ (28)
where v takes value T for the TRAIL scheme and G for the GBL scheme. We compute the first
term on the right-hand-side, the Selection Effect. The second term is the Incentive effect. A
discrete approximation of the Selection effect is
S =
∑
i
[σT (qi)− σG(qi)]TrT (qi) (29)
Note that this requires only an estimate of difference in selection proportions between the TRAIL
and GBL schemes and the heterogenous TRAIL treatment effects. Specifically, we do not need
to estimate heterogeneous GBL treatment effects.
3.6 Summary of Testable Predictions
Before proceeding to the empirical analysis, it is helpful to summarize the theoretical predictions
that can be tested.
Prediction 1 TRAIL Selection Patterns: Among borrowers in his own segment, those the
TRAIL agent recommends are more able than those whom he does not recommend.
Prediction 2 Ability-Informal Interest Rate Relationship: Higher ability borrowers pay
lower interest rates in the informal market.
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Prediction 3 Compression: δ < 1; or, the scale of cultivation varies less with ability for treated
borrowers than for control borrowers.
This follows from a comparison of equations (9) and (11).
Prediction 4 Treatment Effect Heterogeneity: If the TRAIL treatment effect on borrowing
is rising in ability, so is the TRAIL treatment effect on output.
This follows from part (a) of Lemma 2.
Prediction 5 Selection Effect:
(a) The Selection Effect is smaller than the average treatment effect difference.
(b) If the ability distribution among TRAIL selected borrowers first order stochastically domi-
nates the ability distribution among GBL selected borrowers, and TRAIL treatment effects
are rising in ability, then the Selection Effect is positive, and the average treatment effect in
the TRAIL scheme is larger than in the GBL scheme.
Part (a) of this prediction holds because Lemma 3 implies that the Incentive Effect is positive.
Part (b) follows from equation (28).
4 Empirical Results
We start in Section 4.1 by estimating the average treatment effects of the two types of loans
on borrowers’ cultivation, output and farm value-added. This is followed in Section 4.2 by an
examination of the repayment and take-up rates of the loans and the administrative costs and
overall financial performance of the two schemes. Next, in Section 4.3 we test the model’s predic-
tions, and examine whether, and to what extent the difference in selection patterns can explain
the difference in the average treatment effects. Finally, in Section 4.4 we address some ancillary
issues, such as the changes in treatment impacts over time, and concerns that TRAIL agents and
borrowers might have entered into side-transactions that changed the benefits to borrowers.
4.1 Empirical Results About Loan Treatment Impacts on Borrower Produc-
tion and Income
To examine the average treatment effects of the two lending mechanisms, we rely on the fact that
only a randomly chosen subset of the selected borrowers were offered the loans. Any difference
between households that were both selected and offered loans (Treatment households) and that
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were selected but not offered loans (Control 1 households) must be caused by the loans. Clearly,
this estimate is conditional on the selection of these borrowers into the scheme.
Our regression specification takes the form:
yhvt = β0 + β1TRAILv + β2(TRAILv × Control 1hv) + β3(TRAILv × Treatmenthv)
+ β4(GBLv × Control 1hv) + β5(GBLv × Treatmenthv) + γXhvt + εhvt (30)
Here yhvt denotes the outcome variable of interest for household h in village v in year t. The
omitted category is the Control 2 group in GBL villages, so that βˆ0 estimates the mean yhvt
for Control 2 households in GBL villages. The other coefficients each estimate the level of yhvt
for a different group, relative to these GBL Control 2 households. The treatment effect in the
TRAIL scheme is estimated by βˆ3 − βˆ2 and the treatment effect in the GBL scheme is estimated
by βˆ5− βˆ4. All treatment effects are intent-to-treat estimates because they compare the outcomes
of households assigned to Treatment and Control 1 groups, regardless of actual take-up.25
The coefficients βˆ2 and βˆ4 measure differences between Control 1 and Control 2 households within
TRAIL and GBL villages, respectively. Xhvt is a set of additional controls, including land owned
by the households, caste, gender and educational attainment of the household head, two year
dummies to control for secular changes over time and a dummy variable indicating whether the
village received a separate intervention informing residents about the prevailing market price for
potatoes.26
Our sample consists of 2070 households across 24 TRAIL and 24 GBL villages. Since agricultural
activity involves a long delay from planting to harvest, and the harvest could be sold over several
months, we aggregate our data to the annual level in order to correctly compute the costs and
revenues of each crop. Our unit of observation is then household-year. Standard errors are
clustered at the hamlet level.27
4.1.1 Treatment effects on Agricultural Borrowing, Cultivation and Farm Incomes
Table 4 presents the treatment effects on agricultural borrowing estimated using equation (30).
Treatment effects on cultivation of, and incomes from, potatoes are in Panel A of Table 5, effects
25Results are qualitatively unchanged if we instead estimate the treatment effects only on households that took
up the loans, using assignment to treatment as an instrument for actual participation in the scheme. These results
are presented in Table A-4 in the Appendix.
26 The information intervention was undertaken for a separate project aimed at examining the effect of providing
information about potato prices to farmers and is similar to the public information treatment described in Mitra,
Mookherjee, Torero, and Visaria (2017). Villages were assigned to the information treatment randomly and orthog-
onally to the credit intervention that is the focus of this paper. The results are unchanged if we do not include this
information village dummy in the regression specification.
27 The administrative definition of a village in our study corresponds to a collection of hamlets or paras. House-
holds within the same para tend to be more homogenous, are more likely to interact with each other, and arguably
experience geographic shocks to cultivation and market prices that are highly correlated. The results are robust to
clustering at the village-level instead (see columns 1 and 2 of Table A-1 and Table A-2). The treatment effects are
also unchanged qualitatively if we restrict the sample to the Treatment and Control 1 households only (see columns
3 and 4 of Table A-1 and Table A-3).
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on cultivation of and incomes from other crops are in Panel B of Table 5, and effects on total
farm income are in Table 6.
Since we analyze a large number of outcome variables, the null hypothesis of no treatment effect
could be rejected by mere chance, even if it were actually true. To correct for this, in each table
we follow Hochberg (1988) and report a conservative p-value for an index of variables in a family
of outcomes taken together (see Kling, Liebman, and Katz, 2007).28
Effects on Agricultural Borrowing
In column 1 of Table 4 we see that participation in the TRAIL scheme increased the overall
agricultural borrowing of Treatment households by |7568, which is a 135% increase over the
|5590 mean borrowing by TRAIL Control 1 households. The overall borrowing of Treatment
households in the GBL scheme also increased by a statistically significant |5465, which is a 134%
increase over the mean for GBL Control 1 households.
In column 2 of Table 4 we examine if program loans crowded out agricultural loans from other
sources. There is no evidence that this happened in either scheme: the treatment effects on
non-program loans are small and statistically insignificant.
When we consider an index of both borrowing outcomes together in column 3, we find that TRAIL
loans caused a 0.36 standard deviation increase in agricultural borrowing, which is significant
according to the more conservative Hochberg test (p-value = 0.000). The effect of the GBL
treatment is also statistically significant (effect = 0.27 sd, Hochberg p-value = 0.003).29
Effects on Cultivation and Farm Incomes
We now check if the increase in agricultural borrowing led to increased agricultural activity,
output and incomes. Since the loan cycles matched the potato production cycle, we first present
the estimated effects on potato cultivation. From column 1 in Panel A of Table 5 we see that
72 percent of TRAIL Control 1 households cultivated potatoes per year. Although the TRAIL
loans did not increase this likelihood of cultivation significantly, column 2 shows that they did
increase the amount of land placed under potatoes by a statistically significant 28 percent. TRAIL
loans also caused borrowers to increase their expenditure on inputs (column 4) and to produce 27
percent greater output (column 3). As a result TRAIL treatment borrowers earned 28% higher
revenue (column 5) and 37% higher value-added (column 6) than they otherwise would have.30 In
28The variables are normalized by subtracting the mean in the control group and dividing by the standard
deviation in the control group; the index is the simple average of the normalized variables. To adjust the p-value of
the treatment effect for an index, the p-values for all indices are ranked in increasing order, and then each original
p-value is multiplied by (m− 1 + k), where m is the number of indices and k is the rank of the original p-value. If
the resulting value is greater than 1, we assign an adjusted p-value of > 0.999.
29As Table A-5 in the Appendix shows, both schemes also had statistically significant treatment effects on total
borrowing, which includes all loans taken by the household, whether for agricultural or non-agricultural purposes.
Thus, there is no evidence that the schemes crowded out non-agricultural borrowing.
30Value added is computed as the difference between the revenue earned by the household from the crop, and
the cost of all physical inputs purchased for this crop (either through cash or trade credit). If any of the output
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column 7 we report the treatment effect on imputed net profit from potato cultivation, which is
calculated as value-added net of the imputed cost of family labor employed. Net profit increased
by |1939, or 41% above the mean.
Although the GBL loans did not significantly affect households’ decisions as to whether to plant
potatoes and how much land to plant, they did increase expenditure on potato cultivation by
27%. However the average effect this had on revenue, value-added and profits is both relatively
small in magnitude and imprecisely estimated, indicating large variation across GBL borrowers.
The point estimate of percent growth in value-added and imputed profit was 14%, but it was not
statistically different from zero.
In Panel B of Table 5 we consider the acreage and value-added of the other main crops: sesame,
paddy and vegetables. TRAIL loans significantly increased the acreage that Treatment households
allocated to paddy and sesame. The TRAIL treatment effect on value-added is also positive for
all three crops, but it is significantly different from zero only for sesame. GBL loans did not have
significant effects on the acreage, or value-added, for any of the crops.
Finally, column 1 of Table 6 presents the treatment effects on the household’s total farm value-
added, computed by aggregating across the four crop categories. We find that TRAIL loans led
to a 22% increase in overall farm value-added over the Control 1 mean. The GBL treatment
effect was statistically insignificant, and estimated at -1%. As the lower panel shows, the TRAIL
treatment effect on farm value-added was significantly larger than the GBL treatment effect (p-
value = 0.064).31
In column 2 we see that neither the TRAIL nor the GBL loans significantly affected borrowers’
non-agricultural incomes. However, when we take both farm and non-farm income into account
in column 3, we see that TRAIL loans increased borrower incomes by 9.5 standard deviations
(Hochberg p-value = 0.113). GBL loans had no effect (Hochberg p-value > 0.999).
4.1.2 Comparing Productivity of Selected TRAIL and GBL borrowers
Next, we compute the rate of return on program loans, defined as the ratio of the treatment effect
on value-added to the treatment effect on cultivation cost. Since this is the ratio of two treatment
effect estimates, we estimate cluster-bootstrapped standard errors with 2000 replications. As
we see in column 4 of Table 6, in the TRAIL scheme, the rate of return on potato cultivation
expenses was a statistically significant 110%. The corresponding rate of return in the GBL scheme
is estimated at 45%, and is not statistically significant. Across all major crops, TRAIL borrowers
earned a statistically significant rate of return on investment in cultivation expenditure of 101%.
was not sold, a value is imputed to that amount at the median price at which sample farmers in that villages sold
that crop in that year. Given the difficulty of apportioning the household’s annual agricultural borrowing across
the different crops that it planted, we do not subtract interest payments when we compute the value added for
individual crops. However we do subtract all interest payments due on agricultural borrowing when we compute
aggregate farm value added (see Table 6.)
31In Figure A-1 we present the quantile treatment effects for farm value added. The TRAIL treatment effects are
positive and statistically significant for all quantiles above the 35th; the GBL treatment effects are never statistically
significant. Hence, the TRAIL scheme generated increased farm value-added significantly for a wide range of treated
borrowers.
23
The estimate for GBL borrowers was negative, but again, was not statistically different from zero.
The estimated rate of return to GBL loans is too imprecisely estimated for us to infer if the two
rates of return are significantly different.
4.2 Loan Performance
4.2.1 Comparing Repayment and Take-up Rates
The financial sustainability of a lending program critically depends on the repayment rates on
its loans. Our model does not make clear predictions about how the repayment rates on TRAIL
loans and GBL loans would compare. TRAIL borrowers are likely to be more able and therefore
have a lower risk of project failure. On the other hand, GBL borrowers have the benefit of joint
liability so that even if their own projects fail, their group members might repay on their behalf.32
In Table 7, we consider a loan to be repaid if the entire amount due was paid within 30 days of the
due date. Column 1 in Panel A presents the sample means for this variable. Loans were repaid
on time in more than 95% of instances across the three years of the intervention. The difference
between the two schemes is small. A t-test indicates that it is not statistically significant.33
Loan take-up rates can tell us how attractive the loan product is to potential borrowers. We
measure take-up by the number of households who accepted a program loan in a given cycle
as a proportion of those that were offered one in that cycle. Column 2 in Panel A shows that
86% of the loans offered in the TRAIL scheme and 75% of the loans offered in the GBL scheme
were accepted. This difference is statistically significant, suggesting that selected borrowers in the
TRAIL scheme expected to gain more from the loans than selected borrowers in the GBL scheme
did.34
We also measure continuation rates, defined as the number of households who took a loan in a
given cycle as a proportion of those who were eligible in cycle 1. Households may have failed
to continue in the scheme either because they had repaid less than 50% of the amount due in a
previous cycle and become ineligible, or because they chose not to take a loan in the particular
cycle being analyzed. Column 3 shows that 81% of TRAIL Treatment borrowers and a significantly
lower 69% of GBL Treatment borrowers continued on average.
32A TRAIL loan given to a borrower of ability i would be recovered with probability pi, whereas a GBL loan
given to her would be recovered with probability pi + (1 − pi)pj if this borrower’s group member had ability j.
Hence controlling for ability, the GBL loan has a higher repayment rate. However if TRAIL borrowers are more
able on average, this tilts the comparison the other way, so that the net effect is ambiguous.
33As a robustness check we also considered an alternative definition of repayment where a loan is considered to be
repaid if more than 50% of the amount due was paid within 30 days of the due date. The results are nearly identical
to those presented in Table 7 because in the majority of instances borrowers either repaid the entire amount or
nothing at all. This could be because there was a direct link between the amount repaid and the loan size that
borrowers could receive in the subsequent cycle. Results are available on request.
34Note that since loans in our study were only offered to households that had been pre-selected to participate
(through recommendation or self-selection), these take-up rates cannot be compared with take-up rates from other
studies where the entire village population is included in the set of eligible borrowers.
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A more rigorous test of the difference in these indicators would control for seasonal variations
that might affect loan take-up or repayment. Accordingly, we estimate the equation
yhvt = α0 + α1TRAILv + γXt + εhvt (31)
on a dataset of household-cycle level observations, where in the repayment regression yhvt = 1 if
treatment household h in village v repaid entirely a loan taken in cycle t within 30 days of the
due date; in the take-up regression yhvt = 1 if treatment household h in village v who was eligible
to receive a loan in cycle t accepted it; and in the continuation regression yhvt = 1 if household
h assigned to treatment in village v accepted the program loan in cycle t. Cycle dummies Xt
control for seasonal differences. Column 1 in Panel B of Table 7 confirms that the difference in
repayment rates is negligible and not statistically significant. Columns 2 and 3 show that loan
take-up and continuation rates were about 12 percentage points higher in the TRAIL scheme than
the GBL scheme, and that this difference is statistically significant at the 10% level. This result
holds whether we use as the denominator the households that were offered the loan in that cycle
(take-up, Column 2), or instead all households that were offered the loan at the beginning of the
intervention (continuation, Column 3).
4.2.2 Administrative Costs and Overall Financial Performance
Administrative costs were lower for the TRAIL scheme. The per-month cost to the MFI of
operating the GBL scheme in a village was |1463. The cost of running the TRAIL scheme was
substantially lower, at |68 per village. This difference is largely explained by the fact that the
TRAIL scheme did not require group meetings and so had lower personnel and transport costs.
Recall that in both schemes the intermediary (the agent in TRAIL villages and the MFI in GBL
villages) received 75 percent of interest payments as commission, and the repayment rates were
similar. The capital costs of the loans were also the same. It follows that TRAIL loans generated
a higher financial return for the lender.35
4.3 Testing Theoretical Predictions
Now we turn to tests of our theoretical predictions about the patterns of borrower selection in the
two schemes, and about how treatment effects varied with borrower ability in the TRAIL scheme.
For this we first need to obtain ability estimates for each household.
4.3.1 Ability Estimates
We start by examining the correlates of cultivation and output at the household level. Columns
1, 2, 4 and 5 in Table 8 show random effects and OLS regressions of acreage devoted to potatoes
and potato output on observable characteristics, based on equation (17) in Section 3.5.1. As one
35All the loan capital was raised through a research grant, and so the financial sustainability of the two schemes
was not a primary concern for us. However our results suggest that a lender implementing the TRAIL scheme
would break even if it could access the loan capital at the Indian priority sector lending rates for the rural poor.
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might expect, larger, more landed households, those whose heads were Hindu, who did not belong
to the lower castes/tribes, and whose primary occupation was cultivation all devoted more land to
potato cultivation and produced greater potato output. However, in addition to these observable
characteristics, unobservable factors such as skill and technical know-how might also contribute
to farmer ability and therefore determine cultivation and output. Therefore it is preferable to
estimate ability as a function of household-specific factors, incorporating both observable and
unobservable characteristics, following equations (19) and (20). Accordingly we use the following
specification:
yhvt = αh + Tt + Informationv + hvt (32)
where yhvt is either acreage devoted to potatoes or quantity of potatoes produced and αh is
the household fixed effect representing the household’s ability as described above. We include as
controls only year dummies and a dummy variable for villages receiving the orthogonal information
treatment. Recall that we cannot estimate ability for GBL Treatment households because joint
liability loans created differential incentives for households depending on the ability of their group
members. Therefore these regressions are run on all sample households in TRAIL villages and
only on Control 1 and Control 2 households in GBL villages. The results are reported in Columns
3 and 6 in Table 8.
Recall from Section 3.5.1 that while predicted household fixed effects αˆh from this regression
correspond to the ability ζh for control households, they correspond instead to pih ≡ δζh +K for
treated households in TRAIL villages. We, therefore, follow equations (24)–(26) and recover the
ability estimates ζˆh for TRAIL treated households using the procedure described in Section 3.5.1.
The kernel density estimates of the estimated ability indices are shown in Figure 1. The left panel
uses estimates based on the log of potato output; the right panel uses estimates based on the log
of potato acreage. In both panels, the distribution of ability for TRAIL borrowers is bimodal and
spans a wide range of abilities. As would be expected, the generated distributions for Treatment
and Control 1 households in the TRAIL villages are similar, because the Treatment households
were drawn randomly from the set of borrowers recommended by the TRAIL agent. Accordingly,
we can refer to Treatment and Control 1 households together as Selected households. Compared
with Control 2 households, a smaller proportion of TRAIL Selected households is concentrated
around the lower mode and a larger proportion is concentrated around the higher mode. This is
consistent with our prediction that the TRAIL agent screened out low ability farmers.
Although our model has no clear predictions about how GBL group formation varied with house-
hold ability, for the sake of completeness we present in the right panel of Figure 1 the distribution
of ability for Control 1 (or Selected) and Control 2 households in GBL villages. These distributions
suggest that both high and low ability households joined GBL groups.36
We now use these estimates of ability to test Predictions 1–5.
36 We did not find much evidence for positive assortative matching in GBL groups. The Spearman rank correlation
between the ability of any particular member and the median ability of the other members of their group is 0.48
(using either ability estimates). About 62% of the groups included both members with above-median ability and
members with below-median ability.
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4.3.2 Test of Prediction 1
Prediction 1 states that among borrowers in his own segment, those that the TRAIL agent
recommended were more able than those whom he did not recommend. Borrowers can be classified
into four groups: recommended from own segment (RS), not recommended from own segment
(NS), recommended from out-of-segment (RO), and not recommended from out-of-segment (NO).
To distinguish between the abilities of the four groups, we run the following regression on sample
households in TRAIL villages that owned at most 1.5 acres of land:
ζˆhv = δ0+δ1Recommendedhv+δ2Own Segmenthv+δ3(Recommendedhv×Own Segmenthv)+Xv+uhv
(33)
where ζˆhv denotes the estimated ability of household h in village v, and Xv denotes a village
dummy. The variable Recommendedhv indicates whether the household was recommended by the
agent for a TRAIL loan. We define the agent’s segment as made up of households that borrow from
him; so the variable Own Segmenthv indicates whether household h in village v had borrowed from
the agent in the three years before the project began. By including village dummies, we ensure
that the coefficients reflect within-village comparisons of ability, which is appropriate because the
agent was restricted to recommending borrowers from within a single village. The results are
reported in Table 9. In column 1 we use as the dependent variable the estimates of ability derived
from the household fixed effects regression on potato output. In column 2 we use instead the
household fixed estimates from the potato acreage regression.
In the panel titled “Total Effects” it is clear that among the four groups described above, those
whom the agent recommended from his own segment (group RS) had the highest ability. The
difference between the ability of the RS and the NS groups is also positive, although statistically
insignificant. This provides weak evidence in favor of Prediction 1.
As explained in Section 3.2, it is difficult to compare the ability of own-segment borrowers and
out-of-segment recommended borrowers. This is because the agent draws randomly from outside
his segment, and the number of borrowers he recommends from this group may be too small for
the law of large numbers to hold. As it turns out the difference between groups RS and RO is
positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. On the other hand, the point estimate of
ability of group RO is lower than that of group NS, although the difference is not statistically
significant. These results are consistent with the model, where borrowers recommended by the
agent from outside his own segment turned out to be less able than the agent expected.
4.3.3 Test of Prediction 2
Next we test the prediction that more able borrowers paid lower interest rates on informal loans.
Since we were unable to conduct a baseline survey before the study began, we restrict this analysis
to Cycle 1 loans, which were likely to have been negotiated before our intervention began. To
further guard against the concern that the intervention might have affected households’ borrowing
behavior, we restrict attention to Control 1 and Control 2 households only, since none of these
households received the program loans. Under the assumption of no general equilibrium effects,
this effectively allows us to estimate the relationship between borrower ability and the informal
interest rates that they paid. In what follows, we focus on the sample of 661 Control 1 and Control
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2 households with no more than 1.5 acres of land who reported at least one informal agricultural
loan with a non-zero interest rate in Cycle 1.
In Figure 2 we present non-parametric regressions of the informal interest rates on the ability
estimates. In both panels, we see a clear negative relationship, in line with the prediction that
higher-ability borrowers had access to cheaper loans in the informal market. For a formal test of
this relationship, Table 10 reports the results of the regression
rhv =
4∑
i=1
µiQˆhi + hv (34)
where rhv is the informal interest rate as described above, and Qˆhi indicates the quartile of the
ability distribution to which the household belongs.
Columns 1 and 2 use ability estimates from the potato output regression, while columns 3 and 4
use estimates from the potato acreage regression. Columns 2 and 4 include village fixed effects.
As can be seen in the top panel, in all four specifications, the estimated µˆi decrease in ability,
indicating a negative monotonic relationship. Standard errors are averages from 2000 bootstrap
iterations of this regression. The F-statistic shows that the null hypothesis that µ1 = µ2 = µ3 = µ4
is rejected in all four columns at the 99 percent confidence level.
In the second panel, we present pair-wise comparisons of each µˆi. When multiple hypotheses are
tested, some may be incorrectly rejected by pure chance. To guard against this concern, we apply
the Bonferroni correction and adjust the confidence interval. In our case this effectively implies
that only test statistics with a p-value lower than 0.01 are reported as significant. Although this is
a conservative test, in columns 1 and 3 we find that the difference between µˆ1 and µˆ4 is significant,
indicating that households at the lowest quartile of ability paid interest rates that were 12.7 to
13.9 percentage points higher than those at the highest quartile.
4.3.4 Test of Prediction 3
When estimating farmer ability in Table 8 we also estimated the parameter δ, which was defined
in equation (12). Prediction 3 states that δ < 1, or that borrowing and cultivation scale vary less
with ability for treated than control borrowers. Equivalently, risk varies much less with ability
than productivity does. Consistent with this, the point estimates of δ are 0.951 and 0.965 in
columns 3 and 6 respectively. However the estimates are not precise enough to infer whether they
are significantly below 1.
4.3.5 Test of Prediction 4
A point estimate of δ close to 1 suggests default risk varies relatively little with ability, so that case
(b) rather than (c) of Lemma 2 applies. Accordingly, the theory predicts that TRAIL treatment
effects increase in ability.
Table 11 presents heterogenous TRAIL treatment effects for different quartiles of borrower ability.
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In columns 1, 2 and 3 we regress agricultural borrowing, farm revenue and farm value-added on
the treatment dummy interacted with quartile dummies for ability estimates based on the volume
of potato output. In columns 4, 5 and 6 the ability estimate is based on the acreage devoted to
potatoes. Only sample households from TRAIL villages are included in the estimation sample.
Thus, the regression specification takes the form:
yhvt =
4∑
i=1
ξ1i Qˆhi +
4∑
i=1
ξ2i (Control 1hv × Qˆhi)
+
4∑
i=1
ξ3i (Treatmenthv × Qˆhi) + γX′hvt + εhvt (35)
Treatment effects on each quartile of ability are estimated as the difference ξˆ3i − ξˆ2i. Columns 1
and 4 confirm that treatment effects on borrowing increase in ability: while a TRAIL Treatment
household in the first quartile of estimated ability borrowed |656 more than a TRAIL Control 1
household in the same quartile, a household in the second quartile borrowed |2832 more, in the
third quartile borrowed |6327 more, and in the fourth quartile borrowed |9474 more. Once again,
standard errors are averages of cluster bootstrap estimates with 2000 iterations. As indicated by
the relevant F-statistic, the hypothesis that these four treatment effects are equal is rejected with
99 percent confidence.
In the lower panel, we estimate differences between each pair-wise combination. Using Bonferroni-
corrected confidence intervals, we are able to reject the null hypothesis of no difference for four
out of six pair-wise comparisons.
Prediction 4 states that if treatment effects on borrowing increase in ability, then treatment effects
on output should increase in ability as well. Accordingly, we also find evidence that treatment
effects increase in ability when we examine farm revenue (Columns 2 and 5) and farm value-added
(Columns 3 and 6).
Figure 3, plots non-parametric regressions of farm value-added against the estimated ability index,
separately for Treatment and for Control 1 households. In each panel, it is apparent that the
difference between the farm value-added for the two groups of households becomes larger as the
ability level increases, which is consistent with the regression results discussed above.37
4.3.6 Test of Prediction 5
Figure 4 plots the cumulative distribution function of estimated ability for households recom-
mended by the TRAIL agent, and compares this with the corresponding distribution of GBL
Control 1 borrowers. Again, GBL Treatment borrowers are not included in this figure because
the ability index is not estimated for GBL treated households.
In Figure 4 we see that the distribution of TRAIL selected households first order stochastically
dominates the distribution of GBL selected households. At each ability level in the support of the
37Similar figures obtain when we plot non-parametric regressions of borrowing and farm revenue against estimated
ability (figures available upon request).
29
distribution, a larger proportion of the GBL selected households have ability lower than this level
than TRAIL selected households do. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test rejects the null hypothesis
that the distributions are equal with 99 percent confidence.
Given this finding, and the finding in Table 11 that TRAIL treatment effects increase in ability,
Prediction 5 states that the Selection Effect is positive and that the average treatment effect of
the TRAIL loans is larger than that of the GBL loans. We have already shown evidence that both
of the conditions for this prediction are met. We also saw in Table 6 that the average TRAIL
treatment effect on farm value-added is significantly larger than the average GBL treatment effect.
Finally, we can use equation (29) to estimate the Selection Effect, as shown in Table 12. Our
decomposition indicates that the Selection Effect is indeed positive, and accounts for 30–41%
of the overall difference in average TRAIL treatment effects on farm value-added, depending on
which ability estimate we use.38
4.4 Ancillary Issues
4.4.1 Impact of TRAIL on Transactions with Agents
A frequent concern about intermediary-based schemes is that they may promote corruption and
distort the allocation of benefits between the intermediary and intended beneficiaries. For in-
stance, the TRAIL agent may have extracted undue benefits from the borrowers, either by re-
quiring bribes before he recommended them, demanding side-payments, or by manipulating other
transactions with them, such as by charging higher input prices or paying lower output prices.
Although it is naturally difficult to collect data on bribes or side-payments, we do have detailed
data about sample households’ input purchases from, output sales to, and borrowing from the
TRAIL agent.
In Table 13 we analyse input, output and credit transactions between sample households in TRAIL
villages and the TRAIL agent. In each panel, the third row shows the mean incidence of such
transactions for the Control 1 households. Note first that there is no evidence that recommended
households interacted exclusively with the TRAIL agent in these markets. As can be seen in Panel
A, over the 3 years, Control 1 households conducted only about 8% of their input transactions
with the agent, accounting for less than 6% of the value of inputs purchased. Panel B shows
that they conducted 19% of output transactions with the agent, representing 15% of the value
of transactions, and Panel C shows that 16% of Control 1 households borrowed from the agent,
accounting for 5% of their total borrowing.
It is difficult to detect corrupt behavior by comparing the agent’s transactions with Control 1
and with Control 2 households, since these groups of households are likely to be different even
in the absence of any corruption. Differences between Treatment and Control 1 households are
38In unreported results we also construct an alternative ability measure using a household random effects regres-
sion of output/acreage on household observable characteristics. When we use this ability index in the decomposition
exercise, we find that the Selection Effect explains less than 15% of the overall difference in average TRAIL treat-
ment effects on farm value-added. That the selection effect computed using our preferred total ability estimates is
more than twice as large suggests that unobserved characteristics constitute an important component of ability.
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more revealing because the former were drawn randomly from those recommended by the TRAIL
agent. If the TRAIL agent manipulated transactions with treated borrowers, we should expect
to see significant differences between Treatment and Control 1 borrowers. In column 1 we run a
regression of whether the household engaged in the relevant transaction with the TRAIL agent
at all. In column 2 we regress the TRAIL agent’s share in the total volume of (input or output)
transactions the household carried out in that year. In columns 3–8 we run a regression of the
form
yphvt = λ0 + λ1Interacted with agentphv + λ2(Interacted with agentphv × Treatmenthv)
+ λ3(Interacted with agentphv × Control 1hv) + γXhvt + phvt (36)
where Interacted with agent indicates whether the household h in village v purchased the input
p from or sold the crop p to the TRAIL agent of that village in the year t. The difference λ2−λ3
captures whether Treatment households interacted with the TRAIL agent on different terms than
Control 1 households did.
In Panel A, the two significant effects are a slight increase in the price at which farmers purchased
seeds, and a reduction in the rate at which they rented power tillers from TRAIL agents. The
two effects go in opposite directions. The Hochberg (1988) p-value of 0.773 indicates that overall,
borrowers assigned to receive a TRAIL loan continued to pay the same input prices to TRAIL
agents, as households who were recommended, but not offered a loan.
In Panel B we find no significant effects on the quantities of output that borrowers sold to TRAIL
agents, or the prices at which they sold them. Column 1 in Panel C shows that instead of
borrowing more at higher interest rates, treatment borrowers were less likely to borrow from the
agent during the three years of the experiment. The average interest rate charged by the agent
also did not change.
Thus, our evidence does not indicate that the agent extracted side-payments from treated bor-
rowers by engaging in a larger volume of transactions, charging higher prices for inputs sold or
paying lower prices for outputs purchased from the borrowers, using Control 1 households as the
benchmark. It appears likely that the TRAIL treatment households retained control over the
program benefits that accrued to them. These results also cast doubt on the hypothesis that the
agent gave more concessions or useful advice about output sales or input purchases to TRAIL
borrowers, than he gave to others whom he recommended but who did not receive TRAIL loans.
4.4.2 Year-Specific Effects
The TRAIL and GBL treatment effects on agricultural output estimated in Table 5 were averages
across the three years of the intervention. It is informative to examine how these effects varied
across years.
As the left panel of Figure 5 shows, the TRAIL treatment effects on potato acreage are statis-
tically significant in each of the three years. They are also similar over the three years of the
experiment. The point estimate for the corresponding effect in GBL increased monotonically over
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the years, although it was not statistically significant for the first two years and was borderline
significant only in the third year. However, statistically there is no evidence to suggest that the
GBL treatment effects on potato acreage increased over the three years of the experiment. The
differences in the GBL treatment effects were 0.023 acres in Year 2 versus Year 1 (p-value =
0.381), 0.006 acres in Year 3 versus Year 2 (p-value = 0.796) and 0.029 acres in Year 3 versus
Year 1 (p-value = 0.331).
The right panel of Figure 5 shows that for TRAIL borrowers, the estimate of rates of return on
cultivation (aggregated over the 4 major crop categories) increased from year 1 to year 2 and
then remained roughly similar in year 3. However none of the pair-wise differences across years
(year 1 versus year 2, year 2 versus year 3 or year 1 versus year 3) were statistically significant.
For GBL borrowers, the point estimates indicate an increase in the rate of return from a negative
value in year 1 to a positive value in year 2 and then a decline to a negative value in year 3 again.
However once again, none of these changes are significantly different from zero.39
5 Conclusion
The trader-agent intermediated lending (TRAIL) scheme delegates the selection of borrowers for
individual liability loans to local lenders or traders who are experienced at doing business with
farmers in the local community. We compared the outcomes of this scheme with the outcomes of
an alternative treatment (GBL), in which borrowers self-selected into joint liability groups.
Loan recipients in the TRAIL scheme were particularly successful at increasing potato cultivation
and output. Their farm incomes increased significantly, without any off-setting decline in income
from other sources. The outcomes of borrowers in GBL did not change appreciably. This was
despite the fact that both the TRAIL and GBL loans were provided at below-market-average
interest rates, had repayment durations that matched local crop cycles and included insurance
against local yield and price shocks. This makes it unlikely that these loan features were primarily
responsible for the success of the TRAIL scheme. Instead, we argue that the TRAIL scheme
induced agents to select higher ability borrowers than the borrowers who self-selected into the
GBL scheme.
In line with our theoretical predictions, we find that TRAIL selected more productive borrowers
and treatment effects of the TRAIL loans were larger for more able households. We find also that
selection differences can explain between 30 and 40 percent of the estimated difference in average
treatment effects of the two schemes on farm value-added. The remainder of the difference may
be caused by differences in borrower incentives: GBL loans could have had a smaller impact on
borrowing, cultivation and farm incomes because the joint liability tax raised the effective interest
rate. Other factors, such as differential scope for learning or social capital, may also have played
a role. These need to be investigated further in future research.
Loan take-up rates were higher in the TRAIL scheme, suggesting that the scheme had larger ex
ante effects on the average welfare of the borrowers who were offered these loans. TRAIL loans
39The statistical significance of all comparisons of rates of return is inferred from 90% confidence intervals of the
differences of 2000 cluster-bootstrapped estimates, constructed using Hall’s percentile method.
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were repaid at the same high rate as GBL loans. At the same time, the costs of administering the
TRAIL scheme were lower. We found no evidence that TRAIL agents siphoned off the benefits
that accrued to borrowers.
A few qualifications are in order. Only ten loans were offered in each village in either scheme in
our study; the results of this experiment therefore cannot be used to predict the consequences of
a larger scale intervention. Also, our analysis is restricted to impacts on production and incomes;
we have not examined impacts on consumption smoothing, liquidity management, investment or
social empowerment. Neither do we compare the distributive impacts of TRAIL and GBL. At
this stage, therefore, we do not claim that TRAIL is a superior policy alternative to traditional
microcredit schemes. Instead, we limit the objective of this paper to an examination of whether
borrower heterogeneity and selection can account for the differential performance of the two
different schemes.
Future research is needed to examine a number of issues related to our study. These include the
external validity of these results in other regions and contexts, the trade-off between number and
quality of borrowers when TRAIL is scaled up to more borrowers per village, financial sustain-
ability, distributive impacts on farm incomes, impacts on the empowerment of women and other
disadvantaged social groups, impacts on household consumption and liquidity management. Such
evaluations are necessary before any policy suggestions can be made.
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Appendix A: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 2:
(i) Suppose lTi is nondecreasing in i. Take any pair of types satisfying i > j. Then l
T
i ≥ lTj .
Applying condition RC we obtain f
′(l¯i+l)
f ′(l¯j+l)
is increasing in l. Combining this with (1) which
implies f
′(l¯i)
f ′(l¯j)
=
θ¯j
θ¯i
, we therefore obtain θ¯if
′(l¯i + l) > θ¯jf ′(l¯j + l) for any l > 0.
Hence the output treatment effect for type i is
θ¯i[f(l¯i + l
T
i )− f(l¯i)] ≥ θ¯i[f(l¯i + lTj )− f(l¯i)]
= θ¯i
∫ lTj
0
f ′(l¯i + l)dl
> θ¯j
∫ lTj
0
f ′(l¯j + l)dl
= θ¯j [f(l¯j + l
T
j )− f(l¯j)]
the output treatment effect for j.
(b) If the probability of crop success pi is independent of i, equal to p, equations (1, 2) imply
f ′(l¯i+lTi )
f ′(l¯i)
is independent of i. This implies log f ′(l¯i + lTi )− log f ′(l¯i) is a constant. Differentiating
this expression and setting equal to zero, we obtain
1 +
lT
′
i
l¯
′
i
= [−f
′′
(l¯i)
f ′(l¯i)
][−f
′′
(l¯i + l
T
i )
f ′(l¯i + lTi )
]−1 > 1 (37)
owing to RC. Hence the loan treatment effect is rising in i. Applying part (a) we infer the output
treatment effect is rising in i.
Finally consider the income treatment effect for i:
θ¯i[f(l¯i + l
T
i )− f(l¯i)]− pirT lTi = [θ¯if(l¯i + lTi )− pirT lTi ]− θ¯if(l¯i)
≥ [θ¯if(l¯i + lTj )− pirT lTj ]− θ¯if(l¯i)
= θ¯i[f(l¯i + l
T
j )− f(l¯i)]− pirT lTj
= θ¯i
∫ lTj
0
f ′(l¯i + l)dl − pirT lTj
> θ¯j
∫ lTj
0
f ′(l¯j + l)dl − pirT lTj
where the first inequality uses the property that type i chooses TRAIL loan size to maximize his
post-intervention income, and has the option of choosing the loan size selected by type j. The
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Table 1: Balance of Characteristics across Treatment Categories
Panel A: Village Characteristics
All TRAIL GBL Difference
(1) (2) (3) (4=2–3)
Number of households 392.60 327.63 457.58 -129.96
(51.66) (52.28) (88.35)
Percent households electrified 0.60 0.60 0.59 0.01
(0.04) (0.06) (0.05)
Has primary school 0.75 0.71 0.79 -0.08
(0.06) (0.09) (0.08)
Has primary health centre 0.23 0.25 0.21 0.04
(0.06) (0.09) (0.08)
Has bank branch 0.08 0.00 0.17 -0.17***
(0.04) (0.00) (0.08)
Has pucca road 0.33 0.25 0.42 0.17
(0.07) (0.09) (0.10)
Panel B: Household Characteristics
All TRAIL GBL
Treatment Control 1 Difference Treatment Control 1 Difference
(1) (2) (3) (4=2–3) (5) (6) (7=5–6)
Non Hindu 0.182 0.163 0.171 -0.008 0.131 0.118 0.013
(0.008) (0.025) (0.025) (0.022) (0.022)
Low caste 0.404 0.374 0.385 -0.010 0.520 0.459 0.061
(0.011) (0.032) (0.032) (0.033) (0.034)
High caste 0.414 0.463 0.444 0.018 0.349 0.423 -0.073
(0.011) (0.033) (0.033) (0.032) (0.033)
Landholding 0.464 0.448 0.454 -0.006 0.354 0.395 -0.040
(0.009) (0.027) (0.025) (0.025) (0.026)
Male headed household 0.941 0.987 0.991 -0.005 0.930 0.895 0.035
(0.005) (0.008) (0.006) (0.017) (0.021)
Head Education: Primary Schooling 0.420 0.520 0.487 0.033 0.432 0.427 0.005
(0.011) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033)
Joint Significance (χ2(5)) 1.04 5.41
Notes:
Panel A uses village census data collected in 2007 by Mitra, Mookherjee, Torero, and Visaria (2017). Panel B uses household
survey data from the current study and restricts the sample to households with at most 1.5 acres of land. Column 1 includes
Treatment, Control 1 and Control 2 households. Columns 2 and 5 include only Treatment households. Columns 3 and 6
include only Control 1 households. Standard errors are in parentheses. ‡: χ2(5). ∗∗∗ : p < 0.01,∗∗ : p < 0.05,∗ : p < 0.1.
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Table 2: Selected Crop Characteristics
Sesame Paddy Potatoes
(1) (2) (3)
Cultivate the crop (%) 0.46 0.67 0.62
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Acreage (acres) 0.21 0.47 0.31
(0.004) (0.007) (0.005)
Harvested quantity (kg) 145.5 1191.26 5387.76
(2.70) (17.05) (79.74)
Cost of production (|) 335.05 2985.55 7556.46
(8.15) (53.52) (142.30)
Price (|/kg) 30.7 10.3 4.7
(0.169) (0.097) (0.027)
Revenue (|) 1636.38 5561.95 13600.5
(38.37) (102.77) (256.34)
Value added (|) 1300.47 2636.47 5986.28
(33.73) (69.93) (151.43)
Value added per acre (|/acre) 6530.38 6596.34 18139.33
(82.31) (109.82) (296.79)
Notes:
Statistics are annual averages over the 3-year study period, re-
ported for all sample households in TRAIL and GBL villages
with at most 1.5 acres of land. To arrive at representative
estimates for the study area, Treatment and Control 1 house-
holds are assigned a weight of 30
N
and Control 2 households
are assigned a weight of N−30
N
, were N is the total number of
households in the village. Standard errors are in parentheses.
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Table 3: Credit Market Characteristics Before
Experiment
All Loans Agricultural Loans
(1) (2)
Household had borrowed 0.67 0.59
Total Borrowing† 6352 (10421) 5054 (8776)
Proportion of Loans by Source‡
Traders/Money Lenders 0.63 0.66
Family and Friends 0.05 0.02
Cooperatives 0.24 0.25
Government Banks 0.05 0.05
MFI and Other Sources 0.03 0.02
Annualized Interest Rate by Source (percent)
Traders/Money Lenders 24.93 (20.36) 25.19 (21.47)
Family and Friends 21.28 (14.12) 22.66 (16.50)
Cooperatives 15.51 (3.83) 15.70 (2.97)
Government Banks 11.33 (4.63) 11.87 (4.57)
MFI and Other Sources 37.26 (21.64) 34.38 (25.79)
Duration by Source (days)
Traders/Money Lenders 125.08 (34.05) 122.80 (22.43)
Family and Friends 164.08 (97.40) 183.70 (104.25)
Cooperatives 323.34 (90.97) 327.25 (87.74)
Government Banks 271.86 (121.04) 324.67 (91.49)
MFI and Other Sources 238.03 (144.12) 272.80 (128.48)
Proportion of Loans Collateralized by Source
Traders/Money Lenders 0.02 0.01
Family and Friends 0.04 0.07
Cooperatives 0.79 0.78
Government Banks 0.81 0.83
MFI and Other Sources 0.01 0.01
Notes:
Statistics are reported for all sample households in TRAIL and GBL
villages with at most 1.5 acres of land. All characteristics are for
loans taken by the households in Cycle 1. Program loans are not
included. For the interest rate summary statistics loans where the
principal amount is reported equal to the repayment amount are not
included. To arrive at representative estimates for the study area,
Treatment and Control 1 households are assigned a weight of 30
N
and Control 2 households are assigned a weight of N−30
N
, were N is
the total number of households in their village. †: Total borrowing
= 0 for households that do not borrow. ‡: Proportion of loans in
terms of value of loans at the household level. All proportions are
computed only over households that borrowed. Standard deviations
are in parentheses.
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Table 4: Program Impacts: Treatment Effects on Total Borrowing
All Agricultural Loans Non Program Agricultural Loans† Index of dependent
(|) (|) variablesq
(1) (2) (3)
TRAIL 7568*** -364.6 0.36***
(808.1) (646.7) (0.073)
Hochberg p-value 0.000
Mean TRAIL Control 1 5590 5590
% Effect TRAIL 135.38 -6.52
GBL 5465*** -157.8 0.266*
(903.8) (658.9) (0.077)
Hochberg p-value 0.003
Mean GBL Control 1 4077 4077
% Effect GBL 134.04 -3.87
Sample size 6,204 6,204
Notes:
Treatment effects are computed from regressions that follow equation (30) in the text and are run on household-
year level data for all sample households with at most 1.5 acres of land. Regressions also control for the gender
and educational attainment, caste and religion of the household head, household’s landholding, a set of year
dummies and an information village dummy. % Effect: Treatment effect as a percentage of the mean of the
relevant Control 1 group. q: In column 3 the dependent variable is an index of z-scores of the outcome variables
in the panel; the p-values for treatment effects in this column are computed according to Hochberg (1988)’s
step-up method to control for the family-weighted error rate across all index outcomes. †: Non-Program loans
refer to loans from sources other than the TRAIL/GBL schemes. The complete regression results are in Table
A-5. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the hamlet level. ∗∗∗ : p < 0.01,∗∗ : p < 0.05,∗ : p < 0.1.
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last inequality again uses RC in the way described in the proof of (a) above. The expression in
the last line above equals the income treatment effect for type j, less (pi − pj)rT lTj . This last
‘correction’ term equals zero (approximately) when pi does not vary (varies very little) with i.
(c) If productivity does not vary with i, the pre-intervention loan size and output are rising in i,
but after the intervention do not vary with i. Hence the loan and output treatment effects are
falling in i. QED
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Table 6: Program Impacts: Effects on Farm Value Added and Rates of
Return
Farm Value Non-Agricultural Index of Rate of Return‡
Added Income dependent Potato Farm Value
(|) (|) variablesq Cultivation Added
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
TRAIL Treatment 2239.22*** -608.000 0.095** 1.10† 1.01†
(717.75) (4153.557) (0.043) (0.02) (0.02)
Hochberg p-value 0.113
Mean TRAIL Control 1 10142.06 40115.81
% Effect TRAIL 22.1 -1.52
GBL Treatment -105.2 -6092.631 -0.032 0.45 -0.07
(1037.82)) (4959.88) (0.046) (1.10) (0.58)
Hochberg p-value >0.999
Mean GBL Control 1 9387.6 45645.10
% Effect GBL -1.1 -13.35
TRAIL vs GBL p-value 0.064 0.393
TRAIL vs GBL (90% CI) [-1.410, 1.418] [-3.40, 2.56]
Sample Size 6,204 6,210
Notes:
Treatment effects are computed from regressions that follow equation (30) in the text and are run on
household-year level data for all sample households with at most 1.5 acres of land. Regressions also
control for the gender and educational attainment, caste and religion of the household head, household’s
landholding, a set of year dummies and an information village dummy. The full set of results corresponding
to columns 1 and 2 are in Table A-10. ‡: The rate of return is the ratio of the treatment effect on value-
added to the treatment effect on cost. q: In column 3 the dependent variable is an index of z-scores of
the outcome variables in the panel following Kling, Liebman, and Katz (2007); p-values for this regression
are reported using Hochberg (1988)’s step-up method to control the FWER across all index outcomes. In
columns 1 and 2, the standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the hamlet level. In columns 4 and 5,
the numbers in parentheses are the averages of cluster bootstrapped standard errors with 2000 replications.
† indicates that the 90 percent confidence interval of bootstrapped estimates constructed according to Hall’s
percentile method does not include zero. The numbers in square brackets denote the 90 percent confidence
interval of the TRAIL–GBL difference in rate of return, computed using Hall’s percentile method with 2000
replications. ∗∗∗ : p < 0.01,∗∗ : p < 0.05,∗ : p < 0.1.
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Table 7: Loan Performance
Repayment Take up Continuation
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Sample Means
TRAIL 0.954 0.856 0.805
(0.006) (0.008) (0.009)
GBL 0.950 0.746 0.691
(0.007) (0.011) (0.011)
Difference 0.004 0.110*** 0.114***
(0.009) (0.014) (0.014)
Panel B: Regression Results
TRAIL 0.009 0.117* 0.116*
(0.009) (0.067) (0.067)
Constant 1.002*** 0.838*** 0.827***
(0.0006) (0.053) (0.053)
Mean GBL 0.950 0.747 0.694
Sample Size 2,406 3,226 3,512
Notes:
The sample consists of household-cycle level observa-
tions of Treatment households in TRAIL and GBL vil-
lages. The dependent variable in column 1 takes value
1 if a borrowing household fully repaid the amount
due on a loan taken in the cycle within 30 days of the
due date, and that in columns 2 and 3 takes value 1
if the household took the program loan. In column
1 the sample consists of households that had taken a
program loan in that cycle, in column 2 it consists of
households that were eligible to take the program loan
in that cycle, and in column 3 it consists of all house-
holds that were eligible to receive program loans in
Cycle 1. In Panel B, treatment effects are computed
from regressions that follow equation (31) in the text.
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the
hamlet level. †: Difference between mean in TRAIL
and mean in GBL. ∗∗∗p < 0.01,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗ p < 0.1.
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Table 8: Estimating Ability. First Stage Regressions
Dependent variable: Log(Quantity of Log(Acreage under
potatoes produced) potato cultivation)
Random Effects OLS Fixed Effects Random Effects OLS Fixed Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Landholding 2.003*** 2.365*** 1.588*** 1.835***
(0.251) (0.235) (0.182) (0.169)
Non Hindu household -1.818*** -0.443 -1.268*** -0.294
(0.326) (0.360) (0.238) (0.257)
Low caste household -0.510** -0.422** -0.342** -0.323**
(0.227) (0.213) (0.166) (0.154)
Male headed household 0.175 0.192 0.122 0.143
(0.367) (0.347) (0.260) (0.245)
Education of head: at least primary -0.055 0.002 -0.022 0.010
(0.159) (0.144) (0.115) (0.103)
Occupation of head: cultivation 2.699*** 2.443*** 1.932*** 1.749***
(0.203) (0.175) (0.147) (0.126)
Household size 0.175*** 0.195*** 0.124*** 0.141***
(0.040) (0.039) (0.029) (0.028)
Year 2 -0.456*** -0.456*** -0.453*** -0.289*** -0.289*** -0.283***
(0.073) (0.073) (0.065) (0.052) (0.052) (0.046)
Year 3 -0.374*** -0.374*** -0.381*** -0.248*** -0.248*** -0.250***
(0.076) (0.076) (0.070) (0.053) (0.054) (0.049)
Constant 2.898*** 3.637*** 5.554*** -4.967*** -4.348*** -2.976***
(0.417) (0.783) (0.040) (0.297) (0.575) (0.028)
R2 0.2730 0.3718 0.0025 0.2848 0.3888 0.0019
Sample size 4,833 4,833 6,204 4,833 4,833 6,204
Number of households 1,613 2,068 1,613 2,068
δ 0.951 0.965
[0.873, 1.034] [0.891, 1.045]
K 0.567 0.454
[0.115, 1.035] [0.118, 0.794]
Notes:
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the hamlet level. In columns 2, 3, 5 and 6 the estimating sample include Control 1
and Control 2 households in TRAIL and GBL villages with at most 1.5 acres of land. In columns 3 and 6, the estimating sample
includes all sample households in TRAIL and GBL villages with at most 1.5 acres of land. ∗∗∗p < 0.01,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗ p < 0.1. The
numbers in square brackets denote the 90 percent confidence interval computed using Hall’s percentile method with 2000 replications.
† indicates that the 90 percent confidence interval of bootstrapped estimates does not include zero.
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Table 9: Ability Differences and Patterns of Selection into the TRAIL scheme
Ability estimates from: Log(Quantity of Log(Acreage under
potatoes produced) potato cultivation)
(1) (2)
Recommended (δ1) 0.390 0.278
(0.286) (0.205)
Own Segment (δ2) 0.947** 0.715**
(0.463) (0.340)
Recommended × Own Segment (δ3) 0.174 0.071
(0.547) (0.394)
Constant 0.213 0.183
(0.656) (0.477)
Total Effects
Recommended:
Own Segment (RS: δ0 + δ1 + δ2 + δ3) 1.723** 1.247**
(0.704) (0.513)
Other Segment (RO: δ0 + δ1) 0.602 0.461
(0.655) (0.478)
Not Recommended:
Own Segment (NS: δ0 + δ2) 1.159 0.898
(0.784) (0.572)
Other Segment (NO: δ0) 0.213 0.183
(0.656) (0.477)
Difference Estimates
Own Segment: Recommended v. Not Recommended (δ1 + δ3) 0.564 0.349
(0.488) (0.353)
Recommended: Own v. Other Segment (δ2 + δ3) 1.121*** 0.786***
(0.322) (0.236)
Sample Size 1,032 1,032
Notes:
Coefficients are reported from regressions that follow equation (33) in the text. The dependent variable is ability
estimates constructed from household fixed effects, as reported in columns 3 and 6 of Table 8. The regressions
also control for village fixed effects. The estimating sample includes all sample households in TRAIL villages with
at most 1.5 acres of land. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the hamlet level. ∗∗∗p < 0.01,∗∗ p <
0.05,∗ p < 0.1.
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Table 10: Relationship between ability and interest rate paid on informal
loans
Ability estimates from: Log(Quantity of Log(Acreage under
potatoes produced) potato cultivation)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Qˆ1 0.348
‡ 0.328‡ 0.348‡ 0.328‡
(0.085) (0.093) (0.085) (0.093)
Qˆ2 0.246
‡ 0.234‡ 0.250‡ 0.239‡
(0.020) (0.026) (0.020) (0.026)
Qˆ3 0.237
‡ 0.222‡ 0.218‡ 0.209‡
(0.021) (0.023) (0.019) (0.023)
Qˆ4 0.210
‡ 0.211‡ 0.221‡ 0.218‡
(0.010) (0.022) (0.011) (0.022)
Joint Test#:Qˆ1 = Qˆ2 = Qˆ3 = Qˆ4 2321.2*** 1971.1*** 2389.9*** 1994.1***
Village Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes
Sample Size 661 661 661 661
Difference Estimates
Qˆ1 − Qˆ2 0.103 0.094 0.099 0.090
(0.089) (0.088) (0.087) (0.086)
Qˆ1 − Qˆ3 0.111 0.105 0.130 0.119
(0.086) (0.084) (0.087) (0.086)
Qˆ1 − Qˆ4 0.139‡ 0.117 (0.127‡ 0.111
(0.084) (0.086) (0.085) (0.086)
Qˆ2 − Qˆ3 0.009 0.011 0.031 0.029
(0.036) (0.028) (0.033) (0.028)
Qˆ2 − Qˆ4 0.036 0.023 0.029 0.021
(0.028) (.025) (0.029) (0.026)
Qˆ3 − Qˆ4 0.027 0.012 -0.003 -0.008
(0.027) (0.024) (0.026) (0.022)
Average interest rate paid by Control 1 households
Both schemes: 0.242
TRAIL 0.226
GBL 0.260
Notes:
The dependent variable is the average annualized interest rate paid on informal production loans from
traders, moneylenders and family and friends, as reported in Cycle 1. The estimating sample includes all
Control 1 and Control 2 households in TRAIL and GBL villages with at most 1.5 acres who had borrowed
from traders, moneylenders and family and friends in Cycle 1. See discussion on page 27. Loans where
the principal amount is reported equal to the repayment amount are not included. Standard errors
in parentheses are clustered at the hamlet level, and are averages of cluster bootstrap standard errors
from 2000 replications. #: F (3, 7996). ‡: 99 percent Hall’s percentile method confidence interval
incorporating Bonferroni’s correction for multiple hypothesis testing does not include zero. ∗∗∗p <
0.01,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗ p < 0.1.
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Table 12: Decomposition of Average Effect on Farm Value Added by Ability
TRAIL GBL Difference Treatment Effect Difference ×
(TRAIL - GBL) Treatment Effect
(1) (2) (3 = 1-2) (4) (5 = 3 × 4)
Ability estimates from: log(quantity of potatoes produced)
Qˆ1 0.18 0.27 -0.09 629.4 -58.58
Qˆ2 0.24 0.28 -0.04 -2706 112.46
Qˆ3 0.30 0.25 0.05 3521 163.86
Qˆ4 0.28 0.20 0.09 7734 681.33
% of Average Treatment Effect Difference due to Selection Difference 40.76
Ability estimates from: log(acreage under potato cultivation)
Qˆ1 0.18 0.27 -0.09 659.9 -59.39
Qˆ2 0.25 0.29 -0.04 -1354 54.16
Qˆ3 0.28 0.24 0.04 1897 75.88
Qˆ4 0.29 0.20 0.09 6531 587.79
% of Average Treatment Effect Difference due to Selection Difference 29.85
Notes:
Columns 1 and 2 present the fraction of selected borrowers in TRAIL and GBL respectively who
belonged to each estimated ability quartile, and column 3 presents the difference between the two.
Column 4 presents the TRAIL treatment effects on farm value-added from Table 11. The last row in
each panel shows the percentage of the average treatment effect difference between the TRAIL and
GBL schemes that can be explained by the Selection Effect, as per equation (29) in the text.
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Table A-2: Robustness of Results 2. Program Impacts: Treatment Effects in Agriculture.
Alternative Clustering
Cultivate Acreage Harvested quantity Cost of Production Revenue Value Added Imputed Profit‡
(%) (Acres) (Kg) (|) (|) (|) (|)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Potatoes
TRAIL Treatment 0.047* 0.095*** 975.041*** 1908.985*** 4010.208*** 2108.584*** 1938.840***
(0.025) (0.024) (249.701) (632.620) (1060.698) (546.374) (534.952)
Mean TRAIL 0.715 0.333 3646.124 8474.628 14285.467 5739.479 4740.893
% Effect TRAIL 6.564 28.452 26.742 22.526 28.072 36.738 40.896
GBL Treatment 0.053 0.052* 514.011 1600.336** 2342.149 713.290 552.870
(0.048) (0.030) (331.594) (735.408) (1479.915) (833.048) (775.843)
Mean GBL 0.620 0.251 2761.127 5992.080 11014.286 4997.446 4018.796
% Effect GBL 8.586 20.779 18.616 26.708 21.265 14.273 13.757
Sample Size 6216 6216 6216 6216 6216 6216 6216
Sesame
TRAIL Treatment 0.035 0.044** 9.640 25.846 304.917* 278.171** 179.145
(0.025) (0.021) (5.850) (44.772) (159.456) (133.339) (112.534)
Mean TRAIL 0.581 0.266 81.624 436.910 1957.498 1519.558 1080.800
% Effect TRAIL 6.024 16.383 11.810 5.916 15.577 18.306 16.575
GBL Treatment -0.024 0.003 -5.452 16.776 -188.692 -204.157 -129.467
(0.043) (0.030) (8.156) (32.762) (218.261) (203.706) (197.176)
Mean GBL 0.484 0.193 60.848 258.878 1513.138 1252.850 866.288
% Effect GBL -4.959 1.453 -8.960 6.480 -12.470 -16.295 -14.945
Sample Size 6,216 6,216 6,216 6,216 6,216 6,216 6,216
Paddy
TRAIL Treatment -0.005 0.036** 22.214 212.371 471.201** 267.780 135.235
(0.025) (0.014) (21.934) (142.091) (177.856) (189.045) (142.456)
Mean TRAIL 0.744 0.470 569.726 2889.838 5398.490 2556.755 93.133
% Effect TRAIL -0.703 7.667 3.899 7.349 8.728 10.473 145.207
GBL Treatment 0.000 0.011 -36.517 -74.850 114.611 213.507 -120.627
(0.029) (0.022) (57.881) (281.160) (437.564) (277.301) (194.767)
Mean GBL 0.689 0.456 672.894 3225.745 5513.227 2336.837 183.163
% Effect GBL -0.069 2.403 -5.427 -2.320 2.079 9.137 -65.858
Sample Size 6216 6216 6216 6216 6216 6216 6216
Vegetables
TRAIL Treatment 0.000 0.011 27.623 81.354 137.182 51.969 -10.670
(0.019) (0.006) (25.466) (79.376) (222.004) (162.359) (131.075)
Mean TRAIL 0.080 0.015 142.823 307.071 1207.642 889.229 664.507
% Effect TRAIL 0.329 72.131 19.340 26.494 11.359 5.844 -1.606
GBL Treatment 0.010 0.000 1.118 21.933 -308.116 -323.393 -396.598
(0.019) (0.006) (39.512) (134.271) (524.917) (393.604) (351.505)
Mean GBL 0.112 0.022 135.893 404.919 1564.029 1142.350 853.062
% Effect GBL 9.079 0.794 0.823 5.417 -19.700 -28.309 -46.491
Sample Size 6216 6216 6216 6216 6216 6216 6216
Notes:
Treatment effects presented. Sample includes all sample households with at most 1.5 acres of land in TRAIL and GBL villages. ‡: Imputed
profit = Value Added – shadow cost of labour. % Effect: Treatment effect as a percentage of the Mean of Control 1 group. Standard errors
in parentheses are clustered at the village level. ∗∗∗ : p < 0.01,∗∗ : p < 0.05,∗ : p < 0.1.
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Table A-3: Robustness of Results 3. Program Impacts: Treatment Effects in Agriculture.
Recommended/Formed Group.
Cultivate Acreage Harvested quantity Cost of Production Revenue Value Added Imputed Profit‡
(%) (Acres) (Kg) (|) (|) (|) (|)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Potatoes
TRAIL Treatment 0.048 0.094*** 973.523*** 1908.809*** 4014.051*** 2113.447*** 1942.967***
(0.031) (0.028) (302.107) (721.690) (1185.867) (619.217) (589.612)
Mean TRAIL 0.715 0.333 3646.124 8474.628 14285.467 5739.479 4740.893
% Effect TRAIL 6.650 28.360 26.700 22.524 28.099 36.823 40.983
GBL Treatment 0.052 0.053 515.496 1593.643* 2344.036 720.522 559.976
(0.044) (0.035) (393.250) (878.323) (1724.660) (908.683) (855.015)
Mean GBL 0.620 0.251 2761.127 5992.080 11014.286 4997.446 4018.796
% Effect GBL 8.334 21.040 18.670 26.596 21.282 14.418 13.934
Sample Size 2,733 2,733 2,733 2,733 2,733 2,733 2,733
Sesame
TRAIL Treatment 0.036 0.044** 9.743 25.535 309.539* 283.120** 183.070
(0.033) (0.023) (6.821) (44.606) (172.207) (143.565) (125.542)
Mean TRAIL 0.581 0.266 81.624 436.910 1957.498 1519.558 1080.800
% Effect TRAIL 6.264 16.461 11.936 5.844 15.813 18.632 16.938
GBL Treatment -0.025 0.004 -5.741 17.993 -190.955 -207.767 -133.134
(0.043) (0.031) (9.638) (38.547) (252.920) (226.176) (200.260)
Mean GBL 0.484 0.193 60.848 258.878 1513.138 1252.850 866.288
% Effect GBL -5.141 2.017 -9.436 6.950 -12.620 -16.584 -15.368
Sample Size 2,733 2,733 2,733 2,733 2,733 2,733 2,733
Paddy
TRAIL Treatment -0.004 0.035* 22.047 208.594 471.752* 272.167 134.595
(0.032) (0.021) (31.055) (179.907) (281.557) (241.453) (131.514)
Mean TRAIL 0.744 0.470 569.726 2889.838 5398.490 2556.755 93.133
% Effect TRAIL -0.538 7.447 3.870 7.218 8.739 10.645 144.519
GBL Treatment -0.002 0.010 -37.354 -86.749 92.495 200.575 -116.557
(0.039) (0.028) (67.640) (352.057) (442.096) (270.836) (228.690)
Mean GBL 0.689 0.456 672.894 3225.745 5513.227 2336.837 183.163
% Effect GBL -0.290 2.193 -5.551 -2.689 1.678 8.583 -63.636
Sample Size 2,733 2,733 2,733 2,733 2,733 2,733 2,733
Vegetables
TRAIL Treatment 0.000 0.010 25.763 78.973 126.624 43.898 -16.404
(0.021) (0.007) (45.535) (105.759) (419.095) (322.147) (237.174)
Mean TRAIL 0.080 0.015 142.823 307.071 1207.642 889.229 664.507
% Effect TRAIL -0.051 70.509 18.038 25.718 10.485 4.937 -2.469
GBL Treatment 0.011 0.000 1.154 27.972 -287.323 -308.686 -383.217
(0.036) (0.009) (61.136) (179.261) (856.439) (670.745) (576.998)
Mean GBL 0.112 0.022 135.893 404.919 1564.029 1142.350 853.062
% Effect GBL 10.182 2.208 0.849 6.908 -18.371 -27.022 -44.922
Sample Size 2,733 2,733 2,733 2,733 2,733 2,733 2,733
Notes:
Treatment effects presented. Sample includes all recommended/self selected (Treatment and Control 1) households with at most 1.5 acres of
land in TRAIL and GBL villages. ‡: Imputed profit = Value Added – shadow cost of labour. % Effect: Treatment effect as a percentage of
the Mean of Control 1 group. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the para (hamlet) level. ∗∗∗ : p < 0.01,∗∗ : p < 0.05,∗ : p < 0.1.
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Table A-5: Program Impacts: Treatment Effects on Agricultural and Total Borrowing
Agricultural Borrowing Total Borrowing
All Loans Non Program Loans† All Loans Non Program Loans†
(|) (|) (|) (|)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
TRAIL 1,308.805** 1,258.715** 1,492.442** 1,459.568**
(565.824) (568.119) (664.561) (664.593)
TRAIL × Control 1 -214.127 -162.695 52.922 113.626
(615.330) (612.441) (788.683) (785.879)
TRAIL × Treatment 7,353.752*** -527.303 11,056.515*** -172.249
(680.644) (515.345) (1,016.810) (946.401)
GBL × Control 1 331.349 254.498 945.201 909.592
(638.042) (637.770) (901.132) (896.252)
GBL × Treatmnt 5,796.257*** 96.717 8,925.093*** -42.396
(861.049) (568.206) (1,001.017) (666.740)
Landholding 9,017.990*** 8,275.706*** 9,676.143*** 9,571.987***
(667.613) (656.141) (828.726) (818.065)
Non Hindu household -3,283.840*** -2,772.558*** -2,749.312*** -2,544.745***
(634.804) (583.799) (847.094) (822.146)
Low caste household -1,659.136*** -1,658.744*** -1,589.903** -1,865.289***
(546.353) (485.272) (621.189) (583.036)
Male headed household 1,878.520*** 1,349.010*** 2,021.274*** 1,234.385*
(521.125) (505.910) (663.474) (706.150)
Household head: Completed Primary Schooling -121.188 66.508 659.681 775.445*
(384.137) (350.439) (464.343) (438.716)
Constant -503.869 795.939 569.723 2,177.733**
(716.075) (651.976) (919.400) (919.036)
Treatment Effect
TRAIL 7568*** -364.6 11004*** -285.9
(808.1) (646.7) (1177) (1109)
TRAIL Control 1 Mean 5590 5590 7523 7523
% Effect TRAIL 135.38 -6.52 146.27 -3.80
GBL 5465*** -157.8 7980*** -952
(903.8) (658.9) (1143) (895.4)
GBL Control 1 Mean 4077 4077 6005 6005
% Effect GBL 134.04 -3.87 132.89 -15.85
Treatment Differences: TRAIL – GBL 2103* -206.8 3024* 666.1
(1211.07) 923.86 (1632.56) (1418.80)
Recommendation/Group Formation Effect
TRAIL -214.1 -162.7 52.92 113.6
(615.3) (612.4) (788.7) (785.9)
GBL 331.3 254.5 945.2 909.6
(638) (637.8) (901.1) (896.3)
Sample size 6,204 6,204 6,204 6,204
Notes:
Treatment effects are computed from regressions that follow equation (30) in the text and are run on household-year level data
for all sample households with at most 1.5 acres of land. Regressions also control for a set of year dummies and an information
village dummy. % Effect: Treatment effect as a percentage of the mean of the relevant Control 1 group. †: Non-Program loans
refer to loans from sources other than the TRAIL/GBL schemes. In columns 1 and 2 the dependent variable is borrowing for
agricultural purposes. In columns 3 and 4, the dependent variable includes borrowing for both agricultural and non-agricultural
purposes. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the hamlet level. ∗∗∗ : p < 0.01,∗∗ : p < 0.05,∗ : p < 0.1.
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Table A-10: Program Impacts: Treatment Effects on Aggregate
Farm Value-Added and Non Agricultural Incomes
Farm value added Non-Agricultural Income
| |
(1) (2)
TRAIL -202.309 1,167.37
(732.455) (4,619.439)
TRAIL × Control 1 251.979 -11,159.343***
(759.580) (3,686.649)
TRAIL × Treatment 2,491.269*** -11,767.343***
(701.316) (4,211.561)
GBL × Control 1 698.882 -4,744.83
(1,076.983) (5,088.544)
GBL × Treatment 593.686 -10,837.461**
(715.426) (4,600.405)
Landholding 17,984.694*** 3,415.37
(912.779) (5,374.352)
Non Hindu household -4,131.823*** 5,675.42
(884.600) (4,559.521)
Low caste household -2,593.192*** 1,324.12
(561.517) (3,610.341)
Male headed household 2,734.915*** -4,912.29
(819.115) (10,315.913)
Household head completed primary schooling -1,050.253** -260.836
(491.638) (3,031.750)
Constant -1,739.989* 45,738.771***
(1,038.455) (8,109.731)
Treatment Effects
TRAIL Treatment 2239.29*** -608.00
(717.75) (4153.56)
Mean TRAIL Control 1 10142.06 40115.81
% Effect TRAIL 22.1 -1.5
GBL Treatment -105.20 -6092.63
(1037.82) (4959.88)
Mean GBL 9387.58 45645.10
% Effect GBL -1.1 -13.3
Treatment differences: TRAIL – GBL 2344.49* 5484.63
(1264.26) (6413.48)
Recommendation/Group Formation Effects
TRAIL Recommendation 251.98 -11159.34***
(759.58) (3686.65)
GBL Group Formation 698.88 -4744.83
(1076.98) (5088.54)
Sample Size 6,204 6,210
Notes:
Treatment effects are computed from regressions that follow equation (30) in the text and are
run on household-year level data for all sample households with at most 1.5 acres of land. %
Effect: Treatment effect as a percentage of the Mean of Control 1 group. Regressions also control
for a set of year dummies and an information village dummy. Standard errors in parentheses
are clustered at the hamlet level. ∗∗∗ : p < 0.01,∗∗ : p < 0.05,∗ : p < 0.1.
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